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When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?

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  • Sivaram Cheruvu

Abstract

Under what conditions will international compliance-monitoring institutions pursue violations of international law? The European Commission’s infringement procedure is a multi-step process that culminates at the Court of Justice of the European Union when a member state has allegedly violated European Union law. The Commission, however, does not have meaningful enforcement powers, and may potentially spend valuable time and resources on a case only for a member state to not comply with European Union law. To manage this opportunity cost of pursuing other violations of European Union law, I argue that the Commission will strategically delay advancing a case through the infringement procedure when it anticipates that the political conditions will be more favorable for compliance in the future. I provide evidence that the Commission delays infringement proceedings when it expects the election of a new government that will be more likely to comply than the incumbent government.

Suggested Citation

  • Sivaram Cheruvu, 2022. "When does the European Commission Pursue Noncompliance?," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(3), pages 375-397, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:23:y:2022:i:3:p:375-397
    DOI: 10.1177/14651165221087635
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Matthew Gabel & Silje Synnøve Lyder Hermansen & Jay Krehbiel, 2026. "The politics of the Court of Justice of the European Union: A review," European Union Politics, , vol. 27(1), pages 136-178, March.

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