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Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay

Author

Listed:
  • Bernard Steunenberg

    (Leiden University, The Netherlands)

Abstract

Most member states of the European Union (EU) have some difficulty in transposing EU directives. Despite the obligation to comply with EU law, member states are often slow to adopt national policies implementing directives. In this paper I analyse this problem by focusing on the coordination of transposition in the domestic policy arena. Coordination is approached as a game in which one or more higher-level players decide on policy when lower-level players are unable to make a decision. Based on the model developed in the paper, lower-level players sometimes appear to have discretion in shaping the policy transposing a directive. Furthermore, if a single player coordinates the transposition process, the implementing policy differs from the policy specified by the directive. However, a decisionmaking process with more than one higher-level player can result in deadlock, leading to a literal transposition of a directive. Moreover, deadlock between the deciding players may delay the transposition process. Both mechanisms are illustrated by two cases of decision-making on EU directives in The Netherlands: the cocoa and chocolate products directive and the laying hens directive. The analysis shows that the framework developed in this paper contributes to the understanding of transposition.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernard Steunenberg, 2006. "Turning Swift Policy-making into Deadlock and Delay," European Union Politics, , vol. 7(3), pages 293-319, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:eeupol:v:7:y:2006:i:3:p:293-319
    DOI: 10.1177/1465116506066258
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Torsten J. Selck & Bernard Steunenberg, 2004. "Between Power and Luck," European Union Politics, , vol. 5(1), pages 25-46, March.
    2. Tsebelis, George, 1995. "Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 25(3), pages 289-325, July.
    3. Antoaneta Dimitrova & Bernard Steunenberg, 2000. "The Search for Convergence of National Policies in the European Union," European Union Politics, , vol. 1(2), pages 201-226, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Carlos Mendez & John Bachtler, 2017. "Financial Compliance in the European Union: A Cross-National Assessment of Financial Correction Patterns and Causes in Cohesion Policy," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(3), pages 569-592, May.
    2. Thomas König & Lars Mäder, 2013. "Non-conformable, partial and conformable transposition: A competing risk analysis of the transposition process of directives in the EU15," European Union Politics, , vol. 14(1), pages 46-69, March.
    3. Nora Dörrenbächer & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2019. "Passing the buck? Analyzing the delegation of discretion after transposition of European Union law," Regulation & Governance, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 70-85, March.
    4. Egert Juuse & Rainer Kattel, 2014. "Financial Regulation in Estonia," Working papers wpaper57, Financialisation, Economy, Society & Sustainable Development (FESSUD) Project.
    5. Nabitz, Lisa & Hirzel, Simon, 2019. "Transposing The Requirements of the Energy Efficiency Directive on Mandatory Energy Audits for Large Companies: A Policy‐Cycle‐based review of the National Implementation in the EU-28 Member States," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 548-561.
    6. Dimiter Toshkov, 2008. "Embracing European Law," European Union Politics, , vol. 9(3), pages 379-402, September.
    7. Brooke Luetgert & Tanja Dannwolf, 2009. "Mixing Methods," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(3), pages 307-334, September.
    8. Miriam Hartlapp & Gerda Falkner, 2009. "Problems of Operationalization and Data in EU Compliance Research," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(2), pages 281-304, June.
    9. Asya Zhelyazkova & René Torenvlied, 2009. "The Time-Dependent Effect of Conflict in the Council on Delays in the Transposition of EU Directives," European Union Politics, , vol. 10(1), pages 35-62, March.
    10. Tanja A. Börzel & Tobias Hofmann & Diana Panke, 2011. "Policy Matters But How? Explaining Non-Compliance Dynamics in the EU," KFG Working Papers p0024, Free University Berlin.
    11. Stijn Voorst & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2019. "Evaluations as a decent knowledge base? Describing and explaining the quality of the European Commission’s ex-post legislative evaluations," Policy Sciences, Springer;Society of Policy Sciences, vol. 52(4), pages 625-644, December.
    12. Richard Perkins & Eric Neumayer, 2007. "Do Membership Benefits Buy Regulatory Compliance?," European Union Politics, , vol. 8(2), pages 180-206, June.

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