Parliament vs. Supreme court: a veto player framework of the Indian constitutional experiment in the area of economic and civil rights
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References listed on IDEAS
- Roger Congleton, 2001. "On the Durability of King and Council: The Continuum Between Dictatorship and Democracy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 193-215, September.
- Jaivir Singh, 2006. "Separation of powers and the erosion of the ‘right to property’ in India," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 303-324, December.
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- Shruti Rajagopalan, 2015. "Incompatible institutions: socialism versus constitutionalism in India," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(3), pages 328-355, September.
- Romain Espinosa, 2016. "State provision of constitutional goods," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 1-40, March.
More about this item
KeywordsIndian constitution; Property rights; Civil rights; Basic structure doctrine; Public interest litigation; Veto bargaining model; Veto player framework; Supreme Court; Parliament; D-74; K-11; K-40;
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