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The Politics of International Oversight: Strategic Monitoring and Legal Compliance in the European Union

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  • FJELSTUL, JOSHUA C.
  • CARRUBBA, CLIFFORD J.

Abstract

States often violate international agreements, both accidentally and intentionally. To process complaints efficiently, states can create formal, pretrial procedures in which governments can negotiate with litigants before a case ever goes to court. If disputes are resolved during pretrial negotiations, it can be very difficult to tell what has happened. Are governments coming into compliance? If so, are they only doing so when they have accidentally committed a violation or even when they are intentionally resisting? Or are challenges simply being dropped? This paper presents a formal model to address these questions. We develop our theory in the context of the European Union (EU). To test our model, we collect a new dataset of over 13,000 Commission infringement cases against EU member states (2003–2013). Our results suggest that accidental and intentional noncompliance both occur, but that intentional noncompliance is more common in the EU. We find that the Commission is an effective, if imperfect, monitor and enforcer of international law. The Commission can correct intentional noncompliance, but not always. It strategically drops cases that it believes it is unlikely to win.

Suggested Citation

  • Fjelstul, Joshua C. & Carrubba, Clifford J., 2018. "The Politics of International Oversight: Strategic Monitoring and Legal Compliance in the European Union," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 429-445, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:112:y:2018:i:03:p:429-445_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Brigitte Pircher, 2023. "Compliance with EU Law from 1989 to 2018: The Commission's Shift from a Normative to a Regulative Approach," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(3), pages 763-780, May.
    2. Fabio Franchino & Camilla Mariotto, 2021. "Noncompliance risk, asymmetric power and the design of enforcement of the European economic governance," European Union Politics, , vol. 22(4), pages 591-610, December.
    3. Timothy Yu-Cheong Yeung & Michal Ovádek & Nicolas Lampach, 2022. "Time efficiency as a measure of court performance: evidence from the Court of Justice of the European Union," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 53(2), pages 209-234, April.
    4. Yaning Zhang, 2022. "Limits of Law in the Multilevel System: Explaining the European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance Concerning Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(4), pages 1001-1018, July.
    5. Daniel Finke, 2020. "At loggerheads over state aid: Why the Commission rejects aid and governments comply," European Union Politics, , vol. 21(3), pages 474-496, September.
    6. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2019. "The evolution of European Union law: A new data set on the Acquis Communautaire," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 670-691, December.
    7. Steffen Hurka & Yves Steinebach, 2021. "Legal Instrument Choice in the European Union," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(2), pages 278-296, March.
    8. Joshua C Fjelstul, 2022. "Explaining public opinion on the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact during the European sovereign debt crisis," European Union Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 192-211, June.
    9. Ruud van Druenen & Pieter Zwaan & Ellen Mastenbroek, 2022. "Getting State Aid Approved by the European Commission: Explaining the Duration of Preliminary Investigations in the State Aid Notification Procedure," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 545-561, May.
    10. Sivaram Cheruvu, 2019. "How do institutional constraints affect judicial decision-making? The European Court of Justice’s French language mandate," European Union Politics, , vol. 20(4), pages 562-583, December.

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