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The effects of rejecting aid on recipients’ reputations: Evidence from natural disaster responses

Author

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  • Allison Carnegie

    (Columbia University)

  • Lindsay R. Dolan

    (Wesleyan University)

Abstract

How do states improve their international status and prestige short of war? We argue that rejecting international assistance can boost a government’s image by making it appear self-sufficient and able to provide for its citizens, leading many states to decline foreign aid. However, potential recipients only do so when they have the ability to send a credible signal and when they value status highly. We derive these hypotheses from a formal model and then use a survey experiment to demonstrate that international observers alter their opinions about potential recipients when they learn that they rejected international aid. Finally, we gather new data to empirically verify that the more resources and greater military capabilities states possess, the more likely they are to reject aid, even when they require the aid. Our results help to explain why states refuse needed assistance and suggest that many states cultivate images of self-sufficiency.

Suggested Citation

  • Allison Carnegie & Lindsay R. Dolan, 2021. "The effects of rejecting aid on recipients’ reputations: Evidence from natural disaster responses," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 16(3), pages 495-519, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:16:y:2021:i:3:d:10.1007_s11558-020-09393-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-020-09393-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Asmus, Gerda & Eichenauer, Vera & Fuchs, Andreas & Parks, Bradley, 2021. "Does India use development finance to compete with China? A subnational analysis," Kiel Working Papers 2189, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    3. Cheeseman, Nic & Swedlund, Haley J. & O'Brien-Udry, Cleo, 2024. "Foreign aid withdrawals and suspensions: Why, when and are they effective?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Foreign aid; Natural disasters; Signaling; Reputation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid

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