Fundamental theory of institutions: a lecture in honor of Leo Hurwicz
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Brousseau, Eric & Garrouste, Pierre & Raynaud, Emmanuel, 2011.
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- Hamilton, Jonathan & Slutsky, Steven, 2017. "Judicial review and the power of the executive and legislative branches," Research in Economics, Elsevier, pages 67-85.
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More about this item
KeywordsIncentive compatibility; Socialism; Moral hazard; Institutions; B23; P51;
- B23 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Econometrics; Quantitative and Mathematical Studies
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
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