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Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict

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  • Roger B. Myerson

Abstract

Thomas Schelling's Strategy of Conflict is a masterpiece that should be recognized as one of the most important and influential books in social theory. This paper reviews some of the important ideas in Strategy of Conflict and considers some of the broader impact that this book has had on game theory, economics, and social theory. By his emphasis on the critical importance of information and commitment in strategic dynamics, Schelling played a vital role in stimulating the development of noncooperative game theory. More broadly, Schelling's analysis of games with multiple equilibria has redefined the scope of economics and its place in the social sciences. (JEL D74, F51, H56)

Suggested Citation

  • Roger B. Myerson, 2009. "Learning from Schelling's Strategy of Conflict," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 47(4), pages 1109-1125, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:jeclit:v:47:y:2009:i:4:p:1109-25
    Note: DOI: 10.1257/jel.47.4.1109
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    3. Aperjis, Christina & Zeckhauser, Richard J. & Miao, Yali, 2014. "Variable temptations and black mark reputations," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 70-90.
    4. Magnus Hoffmann & Grégoire Rota‐Graziosi, 2020. "Endogenous timing in the presence of non‐monotonicities," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(1), pages 359-402, February.
    5. Coyne,Christopher J., 2020. "Defense, Peace, and War Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781108724036.
    6. Török, Ádám, 2011. "Intézményépítés a túlzott államadósság elleni védekezés érdekében [Building institutions to guard against excessive state debt]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(7), pages 577-591.
    7. Jorge M. Streb, 2018. "Credible signals: A refinement of perfect Bayesian equilibria," CEMA Working Papers: Serie Documentos de Trabajo. 674, Universidad del CEMA.
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    16. Dominiak, Adam & Eichberger, Jürgen, 2021. "Games in context: Equilibrium under ambiguity for belief functions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 125-159.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions
    • H56 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - National Security and War

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