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Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear

  • Luis Corchón


  • José Rueda-Llano


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Article provided by Springer in its journal Review of Economic Design.

Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
Pages: 279-291

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Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:12:y:2008:i:4:p:279-291
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  1. Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-31, July.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-20, September.
  3. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1982. "Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 17-47, June.
  4. John Ledyard & John Roberts, 1975. "On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods," Discussion Papers 116, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009. "Strategy-proofness and single-crossing," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
  6. Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0216, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Aug 2002.
  7. Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1974. "Incentives and Public Inputs," Discussion Papers 29, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. Conley, John P. & Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1996. "Generalized Samuelson conditions and welfare theorems for nonsmooth economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 137-152, January.
  9. Tian, Guoqiang, 1996. "On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 17-24, October.
  10. Ohseto, Shinji, 1997. "Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 157-183, April.
  11. Moulin, Herve, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 305-25, April.
  12. Campbell, Donald E. & Truchon, Michel, 1988. "Boundary optima and the theory of public goods supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 241-249, March.
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