Differentiable strategy-proof mechanisms for private and public goods in domains that are not necessarily large or quasi-linear
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Volume (Year): 12 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Saporiti, Alejandro, 2009.
"Strategy-proofness and single-crossing,"
Econometric Society, vol. 4(2), June.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2007. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP48, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Alejandro Saporiti, 2008. "Strategy-Proofness and Single-Crossing," Wallis Working Papers WP55, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
- Campbell, Donald E. & Truchon, Michel, 1988. "Boundary optima and the theory of public goods supply," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 241-249, March.
- Conley, John P. & Diamantaras, Dimitrios, 1996. "Generalized Samuelson conditions and welfare theorems for nonsmooth economies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 137-152, January.
- John Ledyard & John Roberts, 1975. "On the Incentive Problem with Public Goods," Discussion Papers 116, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1982. "Nash and dominant strategy implementation in economic environments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 17-47, June.
- Serizawa, Shigehiro & Weymark, John A., 2003. "Efficient strategy-proof exchange and minimum consumption guarantees," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 246-263, April.
- Shigehiro Serizawa & John A. Weymark, 2002. "Efficient Strategy-Proof Exchange and Minimum Consumption Guarantees," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0216, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics, revised Aug 2002.
- Groves, Theodore & Loeb, Martin, 1975. "Incentives and public inputs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 211-226, August.
- Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, 1974. "Incentives and Public Inputs," Discussion Papers 29, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Ohseto, Shinji, 1997. "Strategy-proof mechanisms in public good economies," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 157-183, April.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1980. "A Differential Approach to Dominant Strategy Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1507-1520, September.
- Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
- Groves, Theodore, 1973. "Incentives in Teams," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 617-631, July.
- Tian, Guoqiang, 1996. "On the existence of optimal truth-dominant mechanisms," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 53(1), pages 17-24, October. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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