A simple note on herd behaviour
In his "Simple model of herd behaviour", Banerjee (1992) shows that - in a sequential game - if the first two players have chosen the same action, player 3 and all subsequent players will ignore his/her own information and start a herd, an irreversible one. In this paper we analyse the role played by the tie-breaking assumptions in reaching the equilibrium. We showed that: players' strategies are parameter dependent; an incorrect herd could be reversed; a correct herd is irreversible.
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Volume (Year): 18 (2008)
Issue (Month): 5 (October)
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