Testing for the principal’s monopsony power in agency contracts
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsOligopsony; Principal–agent model; Production contracts; C33; D43; J41; J43; L13;
- C33 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Models with Panel Data; Spatio-temporal Models
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- J41 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Labor Contracts
- J43 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Agricultural Labor Markets
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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