Political Leadership, Conflict and the Prospects for Constitutional Peace
The emphasis on constitutional political economy has been that new rules and institutions can be devised that improve the welfare of a society. Given the number of societies that are infected with political conflict and, as a result, lower levels of welfare, this paper attempts to analyze why we do not see more constitutional conventions aimed at eliminating conflict. The key idea is that expressively motivated group members may create incentives for instrumentally motivated group leaders such that it leads them to choose conflict rather than compromise. Nonetheless, it is not argued that such a peace is impossible to obtain. This leads to a further question, that if such a constitutional agreement could be found, would the expressive perspective alter the conventional instrumental perspective on the sort of constitutional reform that should be undertaken?
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10101/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daron Acemoglu, 2002.
"Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment and Politics,"
NBER Working Papers
9377, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Acemoglu, Daron, 2003. "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 620-652, December.
- Herschel Grossman, 2002.
"Constitution or Conflict?,"
2002-01, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Gregory D. Hess & Athanasios Orphanides, 1999.
"War and Democracy,"
CESifo Working Paper Series
201, CESifo Group Munich.
- Horowitz, Donald L., 2002. "Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: The Sources of an Unlikely Constitutional Consensus," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(02), pages 193-220, April.
- Voigt, Stefan, 2009. "Explaining constitutional garrulity," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 290-303, December.
- Geoffrey Brennan & Alan Hamlin, 2002. "Expressive Constitutionalism," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 299-311, December.
- Tyler Cowen, 2004. "A Road Map to Middle Eastern peace? -- A Public Choice Perspective," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(1_2), pages 1-10, 01.
- Hess, Gregory D & Orphanides, Athanasios, 1995. "War Politics: An Economic, Rational-Voter Framework," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 828-46, September.
- Brennan, Geoffrey & Hamlin, Alan, 1999. "On Political Representation," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(01), pages 109-127, January.
- Alan Hamlin & Colin Jennings, 2004. "Group Formation and Political Conflict: Instrumental and Expressive Approaches," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 118(3_4), pages 413-435, 03.
- Edward L. Glaeser, 2005. "The Political Economy of Hatred," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 120(1), pages 45-86.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:83-94. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.