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Distributed Dynamic Reinforcement of Efficient Outcomes in Multiagent Coordination and Network Formation

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s13235-011-0038-z
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    Article provided by Springer in its journal Dynamic Games and Applications.

    Volume (Year): 2 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (March)
    Pages: 18-50

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    Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:2:y:2012:i:1:p:18-50
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-011-0038-z
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/13235

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    1. Matsui Akihiko & Matsuyama Kiminori, 1995. "An Approach to Equilibrium Selection," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 415-434, April.
    2. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215.
    3. Ed Hopkins & Martin Posch, 2003. "Attainability of Boundary Points under Reinforcement Learning," ESE Discussion Papers 79, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    4. Crawford, Vincent P., 1985. "Learning behavior and mixed-strategy Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 69-78, March.
    5. Tilman Börgers & Rajiv Sarin, "undated". "Learning Through Reinforcement and Replicator Dynamics," ELSE working papers 051, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    6. J. Bergin & B. Lipman, 2010. "Evolution with State-Dependent Mutations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 486, David K. Levine.
    7. Conlisk, John, 1993. "Adaptation in games : Two solutions to the Crawford puzzle," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 25-50, September.
    8. Karandikar, Rajeeva & Mookherjee, Dilip & Ray, Debraj & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 1998. "Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 292-331, June.
    9. Borkar,Vivek S., 2008. "Stochastic Approximation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521515924, October.
    10. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
    11. Alan Beggs, 2002. "On the Convergence of Reinforcement Learning," Economics Series Working Papers 96, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    12. Tang, Fang-Fang, 2001. "Anticipatory learning in two-person games: some experimental results," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 221-232, February.
    13. Michel Benaim & Josef Hofbauer & Ed Hopkins, 2005. "Learning in Games with Unstable Equilibria," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000609, UCLA Department of Economics.
    14. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414.
    15. Young, H Peyton, 1993. "The Evolution of Conventions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 57-84, January.
    16. Matthew O. Jackson & Bhaskar Dutta, 2000. "original papers : The stability and efficiency of directed communication networks," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 5(3), pages 251-272.
    17. Sergiu Hart, 2005. "Adaptive Heuristics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1401-1430, 09.
    18. Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
    19. Arthur, W Brian, 1993. "On Designing Economic Agents That Behave Like Human Agents," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 1-22, February.
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