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Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods

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  • N. M. Galieva

    (St. Petersburg Branch of the Higher School of Economics)

  • A. V. Korolev

    (St. Petersburg Branch of the Higher School of Economics)

  • G. A. Ougolnitsky

    (Southern Federal University)

Abstract

The discrete- and continuous-time network models of opinions control and resource allocation in marketing are considered. Three cases of interaction of economic agents are studied: independent behavior, cooperation, and hierarchical control by the resource-owning Principal. The corresponding dynamic games are analytically solved. The agents’ payoffs in these cases are compared. Two concepts, “enough resources” and “a lack of resources,” are introduced and investigated. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.

Suggested Citation

  • N. M. Galieva & A. V. Korolev & G. A. Ougolnitsky, 2024. "Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 362-395, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:dyngam:v:14:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s13235-023-00494-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s13235-023-00494-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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