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On the role of heterogeneous and imperfect information in a laboratory financial market

Author

Listed:
  • Simone Alfarano
  • Iván Barreda-Tarrazona

    ()

  • Eva Camacho-Cuena

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze the behavior of a group of heterogeneously informed investors in an laboratory asset market. Our experimental setting is inspired by Huber et al. (On the benefit of information in markets with heterogeneously informed traders: an experimental study, 2004). However, instead of their system of cumulative and exogenously given information structure, we introduce an information market where the traders can buy an imperfect prediction of the future value of the dividend with a maximum anticipation of four periods. The accuracy of the prediction decreases with the chosen time horizon, whereas its price remains constant. Our results confirm a non-strictly monotonic increasing value of the information. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Simone Alfarano & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Eva Camacho-Cuena, 2006. "On the role of heterogeneous and imperfect information in a laboratory financial market," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 14(4), pages 417-433, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:cejnor:v:14:y:2006:i:4:p:417-433
    DOI: 10.1007/s10100-006-0014-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Sunder, Shyam, 1992. "Market for Information: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(3), pages 667-695, May.
    2. Huber, Jurgen & Kirchler, Michael & Sutter, Matthias, 2008. "Is more information always better: Experimental financial markets with cumulative information," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 86-104, January.
    3. Smith, Vernon L & Suchanek, Gerry L & Williams, Arlington W, 1988. "Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1119-1151, September.
    4. Sunder, S., 1992. "Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey," GSIA Working Papers 1992-19, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
    5. Charles Noussair & Stephane Robin & Bernard Ruffieux, 2001. "Price Bubbles in Laboratory Asset Markets with Constant Fundamental Values," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 4(1), pages 87-105, June.
    6. John D. Hey & Andrea Morone, 2004. "Do Markets Drive Out Lemmings-or Vice Versa?," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 71(284), pages 637-659, November.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Morone, Andrea & Nuzzo, Simone, 2015. "Market Efficiency, Trading Institutions and Information Mirages: evidence from an experimental asset market," MPRA Paper 67448, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Adriana Breaban & Juan Carlos Matallín-Sáez & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Mª Rosario Balaguer-Franch, 2014. "Special Section: Experiments on Learning, Methods, and Voting," Pacific Economic Review, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 19(3), pages 332-354, August.
    3. repec:eee:beexfi:v:13:y:2017:i:c:p:42-50 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Giovanni Ferri & Andrea Morone, 2014. "The effect of rating agencies on herd behaviour," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 107-127, April.
    5. Barreda Tarrazona, Iván J. & Grimalda, Gianluca & Morone, Andrea & Nuzzo, Simone & Teglio, Andrea, 2017. "Centralizing information improves market efficiency more than increasing information: Results from experimental asset markets," Kiel Working Papers 2072, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    6. Nuzzo, Simone & Morone, Andrea, 2017. "Asset markets in the lab: A literature review," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(C), pages 42-50.
    7. Philipp Hornung & Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger & Roland Mestel & Stefan Palan, 2015. "Insider behavior under different market structures: experimental evidence on trading patterns, manipulation, and profitability," Central European Journal of Operations Research, Springer;Slovak Society for Operations Research;Hungarian Operational Research Society;Czech Society for Operations Research;Österr. Gesellschaft für Operations Research (ÖGOR);Slovenian Society Informatika - Section for Operational Research;Croatian Operational Research Society, vol. 23(2), pages 357-373, June.
    8. Adriana Gabriela Breaban & Juan Carlos Matallín-Sáez & Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Mª Rosario Balaguer-Franch, 2012. "The demand for structured products: an experimental approach," Working Papers 2012/15, Economics Department, Universitat Jaume I, Castellón (Spain).
    9. Iván Barreda-Tarrazona & Juan Matallín-Sáez & Mª Balaguer-Franch, 2011. "Measuring Investors’ Socially Responsible Preferences in Mutual Funds," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 103(2), pages 305-330, October.
    10. Simone Alfarano & Andrea Morone & Eva Camacho, 2011. "The role of public and private information in a laboratory financial market," Working Papers. Serie AD 2011-06, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).

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