Market for Information: Experimental Evidence
Equilibrium predictions of the noisy rational expectations model are relatively accurate for laboratory asset and information markets. When information about an asset's uncertain dividend is sold to a fixed number of highest bidders, prices, allocations, efficiency, and a distribution of profit predictions of the full revelation rational expectations model in the asset market dominate the predictions of the Walrasian model; demand for information shifts leftward and its price approaches zero. When the price of information is fixed, the number of informed agents and the informativeness of the asset market adjusts to permit the information buyers to recover their investment in information. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.
Volume (Year): 60 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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