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Senior leadership succession and market share: An econometric case study on Native American casinos

Author

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  • Mark Legg
  • Apostolos Ampountolas
  • Murat Hancer

Abstract

Little is known on how turnover and senior leadership attributes affect the long-term performance of a casino resort. The ability to longitudinally measure the turnover effect on market share has been problematic due to most gaming markets exhibiting dynamic conditions with exogenous factors that provide competitive advantages. This study analyzed the effect the turnover rate and successor attributes of the CEO and Chairman of Tribal Council positions have on their casinos’ market share within a balanced oligopolistic market of Connecticut. Additionally, this study investigated which attributes amplify the sensitivity of the CEO tenure status to market share growth. The results suggest increased CEO turnover and CEO hires who already had prior CEO casino experience hinder long-term market share. Moreover, the tenures of more experienced CEOs were less susceptible to market share performance. The results can be leveraged for improved hiring practices at the senior levels of Native American casinos.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Legg & Apostolos Ampountolas & Murat Hancer, 2022. "Senior leadership succession and market share: An econometric case study on Native American casinos," Tourism Economics, , vol. 28(8), pages 2176-2196, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:28:y:2022:i:8:p:2176-2196
    DOI: 10.1177/13548166211035579
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    References listed on IDEAS

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