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The Impact of Assessment and Accountability on Teacher Recruitment and Retention

Author

Listed:
  • Donald Boyd

    (State University of New York at Albany)

  • Hamilton Lankford

    (State University of New York at Albany)

  • Susanna Loeb

    (Stanford University, California)

  • James Wyckoff

    (State University of New York at Albany)

Abstract

This article uses data on every teacher in New York State public elementary schools from 1994-1995 through 2001-2002 to examine the response of teachers to the implementation of state-mandated testing. The authors ask whether the introduction of testing in the fourth grade has increased the turnover of fourth-grade teachers, whether testing differentially affected the decisions of teachers with particular attributes, and whether the characteristics of teachers entering the fourth grade changed with the introduction of testing. The authors find that the turnover rate of fourth-grade teachers decreased relative to teachers in other elementary grades since testing began. In addition, entering fourth-grade teachers are less likely to be inexperienced teachers than those moving into other elementary school grades.

Suggested Citation

  • Donald Boyd & Hamilton Lankford & Susanna Loeb & James Wyckoff, 2008. "The Impact of Assessment and Accountability on Teacher Recruitment and Retention," Public Finance Review, , vol. 36(1), pages 88-111, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:pubfin:v:36:y:2008:i:1:p:88-111
    DOI: 10.1177/1091142106293446
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Donald Boyd & Pamela Grossman & Hamilton Lankford & Susanna Loeb & James Wyckoff, 2006. "How Changes in Entry Requirements Alter the Teacher Workforce and Affect Student Achievement," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 1(2), pages 176-216, April.
    2. Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor & Roger Aliaga Diaz, 2004. "Do school accountability systems make it more difficult for low-performing schools to attract and retain high-quality teachers?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(2), pages 251-271.
    3. Richard J. Murnane & John B. Willett & Yves Duhaldeborde & John H. Tyler, 2000. "How important are the cognitive skills of teenagers in predicting subsequent earnings?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(4), pages 547-568.
    4. Brian A. Jacob & Steven D. Levitt, 2003. "Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(3), pages 843-877.
    5. Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, 2005. "Does school accountability lead to improved student performance?," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(2), pages 297-327.
    6. Jonah E. Rockoff, 2004. "The Impact of Individual Teachers on Student Achievement: Evidence from Panel Data," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(2), pages 247-252, May.
    7. David N. Figlio & Lawrence S. Getzler, 2002. "Accountability , Ability and Disability: Gaming the System," NBER Working Papers 9307, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Burgess, Simon, 2016. "Human Capital and Education: The State of the Art in the Economics of Education," IZA Discussion Papers 9885, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    2. Jonah E. Rockoff & Brian A. Jacob & Thomas J. Kane & Douglas O. Staiger, 2011. "Can You Recognize an Effective Teacher When You Recruit One?," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 6(1), pages 43-74, January.
    3. Reback, Randall, 2008. "Teaching to the rating: School accountability and the distribution of student achievement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 1394-1415, June.
    4. Sarah C. Fuller & Helen F. Ladd, 2013. "School-Based Accountability and the Distribution of Teacher Quality Across Grades in Elementary School," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 8(4), pages 528-559, October.
    5. Feng, Li & Figlio, David & Sass, Tim, 2018. "School accountability and teacher mobility," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 1-17.
    6. Tom Ahn, 2017. "Strategic Matching of Teachers and Schools with (and without) Accountability Pressure," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 12(4), pages 516-535, Fall.
    7. Matthew Shirrell, 2018. "The Effects of Subgroup-Specific Accountability on Teacher Turnover and Attrition," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 13(3), pages 333-368, Summer.
    8. Sam Sims, 2016. "High-Stakes Accountability and Teacher Turnover: how do different school inspection judgements affect teachers' decisions to leave their school?," DoQSS Working Papers 16-14, Quantitative Social Science - UCL Social Research Institute, University College London.

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