A model of non-informational preference change
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent's preferences. Any change in these 'motivationally salient' dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.
Volume (Year): 23 (2011)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
|Contact details of provider:|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
- Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001.
"A Theory of Reciprocity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gerard Debreu, 1959. "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 76, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Franz Dietrich, 2012.
"Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework,"
- Dietrich, Franz, 2012. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 471-494.
- Dietrich Franz, 2008. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
- Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001.
"Preference Evolution and Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
- Matthew Rabin., 1997.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Economics Working Papers
97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:23:y:2011:i:2:p:145-164. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.