IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/gamebe/v76y2012i2p471-494.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework

Author

Listed:
  • Dietrich, Franz

Abstract

Economic models describe individuals by underlying characteristics, such as the degree to which they like music, have sympathy, want success, need recognition, etc. In reality, such characteristics change through experiences: taste for Mozart changes through attending concerts, sympathy through meeting people, etc. Models typically ignore change, partly because it is unclear how to incorporate it. I develop a general axiomatic framework for defining, analysing and comparing rival models of change. Seemingly basic postulates on modelling change have strong implications, like irrelevance of the order in which someone has his experiences and ‘linearity’ of change. This paper is a step towards placing the modelling of change on axiomatic grounds and enabling non-arbitrary incorporation of change into economic models.

Suggested Citation

  • Dietrich, Franz, 2012. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 471-494.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:471-494
    DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.006
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825612000905
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.geb.2012.06.006?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2006. "A theory of reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 293-315, February.
    2. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    3. R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
    4. Dekel, Eddie & Ely, Jeffrey & Yilankaya, Okan, 2004. "Evolution of Preferences," Microeconomics.ca working papers dekel-04-08-13-01-21-07, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 09 Jun 2006.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2004. "A theory of sequential reciprocity," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 268-298, May.
    6. Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
    7. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
    8. Matthew Rabin, 1998. "Psychology and Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
    9. Samuel Bowles, 1998. "Endogenous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 75-111, March.
    10. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001. "Preference Evolution and Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
    11. Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
    12. Geanakoplos, John & Pearce, David & Stacchetti, Ennio, 1989. "Psychological games and sequential rationality," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 60-79, March.
    13. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    14. Eddie Dekel & Jeffrey C. Ely & Okan Yilankaya, 2007. "Evolution of Preferences -super-1," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 74(3), pages 685-704.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian & Bradley, Richard, 2016. "Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 352-371.
    2. Franz Dietrich, 2014. "Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 405-441, July.
    3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2011. "A model of non-informational preference change," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 145-164, April.
    4. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2013. "Reason-Based Rationalization," MPRA Paper 51776, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Mentalism Versus Behaviourism In Economics: A Philosophy-Of-Science Perspective," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 249-281, July.
    7. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-01249632 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. repec:cep:stitep:/2014/565 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249635 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian & Bradley, Richard, 2016. "Belief revision generalized: A joint characterization of Bayes' and Jeffrey's rules," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 162(C), pages 352-371.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Where do preferences come from?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 613-637, August.
    2. Franz Dietrich, 2014. "Anti-terrorism policies and the risk of provoking," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(3), pages 405-441, July.
    3. Christian Korth, 2009. "Reciprocity—An Indirect Evolutionary Analysis," Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems, in: Fairness in Bargaining and Markets, chapter 0, pages 35-55, Springer.
    4. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2011. "A model of non-informational preference change," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 23(2), pages 145-164, April.
    5. Manapat, Michael L. & Nowak, Martin A. & Rand, David G., 2013. "Information, irrationality, and the evolution of trust," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 90(S), pages 57-75.
    6. Jacobs Martin, 2016. "Accounting for Changing Tastes: Approaches to Explaining Unstable Individual Preferences," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 67(2), pages 121-183, August.
    7. Kirchsteiger, G. & Rigotti, L. & Rustichini, A., 2000. "Your Morals are Your Moods," Discussion Paper 2000-122, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    8. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2015. "Desert and inequity aversion in teams," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 42-54.
    9. Tóbiás, Áron, 2023. "Rational Altruism," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 207(C), pages 50-80.
    10. Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 66, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. Friedman, Daniel & Singh, Nirvikar, 2009. "Equilibrium vengeance," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 813-829, July.
    12. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2010. "Fairness and desert in tournaments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 346-364, July.
    13. Becker, Johannes & Hopp, Daniel & Süß, Karolin, 2020. "How altruistic is indirect reciprocity? - Evidence from gift-exchange games in the lab," VfS Annual Conference 2020 (Virtual Conference): Gender Economics 224592, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Segal, Uzi & Sobel, Joel, 2007. "Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 197-216, September.
    15. Carrasco, Jose A. & Harrison, Rodrigo & Villena, Mauricio G., 2022. "Strategic reciprocity and preference formation," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 203(C), pages 368-381.
    16. Gill, David & Stone, Rebecca, 2009. "Fairness and desert in tournaments," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 903, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    17. Hahn, Volker & Mühe, Felix, 2009. "Committees and reciprocity," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 26-47, January.
    18. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2003. "Understanding reciprocity," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 1-27, January.
    19. Sylvain Chassang & Christian Zehnder, 2013. "Contracting Without a Plan: A Theory of Informal Justice," Working Papers 1456, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    20. Laurence Kranich & Joan Esteban, 2002. "A Theory of Endogenous Sentiments," Discussion Papers 02-11, University at Albany, SUNY, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Change; Taste; Sympathy; Altruism; Rational choice; Axiomatic foundations; Dynamic (in)consistency; Externalities;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - General
    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • D0 - Microeconomics - - General
    • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:471-494. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.