A Model of Non-Informational Preference Change
According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent''s fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, this model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change.Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent''s preferences.Any change in these `motivationally salient'' dimensions can change the agent''s preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht|
Phone: +31 (0)43 38 83 830
Web page: http://www.maastrichtuniversity.nl/
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- R. H. Strotz, 1955. "Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(3), pages 165-180.
- Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E., 2001.
"Preference Evolution and Reciprocity,"
Journal of Economic Theory,
Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 273-297, April.
- Dietrich, Franz, 2012.
"Modelling change in individual characteristics: An axiomatic framework,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 471-494.
- Dietrich Franz, 2008. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework," Research Memorandum 045, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Franz Dietrich, 2012. "Modelling change in individual characteristics: an axiomatic framework," Post-Print halshs-00977998, HAL.
- Fehr, Ernst & Gachter, Simon, 1998. "Reciprocity and economics: The economic implications of Homo Reciprocans1," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 845-859, May.
- Matthew Rabin, 1998.
"Psychology and Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 36(1), pages 11-46, March.
- Rabin, Matthew, 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8jd5z5j2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Matthew Rabin., 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Economics Working Papers 97-251, University of California at Berkeley.
- Falk, Armin & Fischbacher, Urs, 2001.
"A Theory of Reciprocity,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
3014, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Dryzek, John S., 1992. "How Far is it from Virginia and Rochester to Frankfurt? Public Choice as Critical Theory," British Journal of Political Science, Cambridge University Press, vol. 22(04), pages 397-417, October.
- Stigler, George J & Becker, Gary S, 1977. "De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(2), pages 76-90, March.
- Gerard Debreu, 1959. "Topological Methods in Cardinal Utility Theory," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 76, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Peter J. Hammond, 1976. "Changing Tastes and Coherent Dynamic Choice," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 159-173.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:unm:umamet:2009015. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Leonne Portz)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.