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A model of non-informational preference change

Author

Listed:
  • Franz Dietrich

    (CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, PSE - Paris School of Economics - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - ENS-PSL - École normale supérieure - Paris - PSL - Université Paris Sciences et Lettres - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - ENPC - École nationale des ponts et chaussées - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - INRAE - Institut National de Recherche pour l’Agriculture, l’Alimentation et l’Environnement, CES - Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne - UP1 - Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

  • Christian List

    (LSE - London School of Economics and Political Science)

Abstract

According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a role in shaping the agent's preferences. Any change in these ‘motivationally salient' dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics.

Suggested Citation

  • Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2011. "A model of non-informational preference change," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-01971020, HAL.
  • Handle: RePEc:hal:cesptp:halshs-01971020
    DOI: 10.1177/0951629810394700
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    1. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01249514 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2016. "Reason-Based Choice And Context-Dependence: An Explanatory Framework," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 32(2), pages 175-229, July.
    3. Franz Dietrich & Christian List, 2013. "Where do preferences come from?," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(3), pages 613-637, August.
    4. Sharun Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2018. "The Political Economy of Ideas: On Ideas Versus Interests in Policymaking," NBER Working Papers 24467, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Acharya, Avidit & Blackwell, Matthew & Sen, Maya, 2015. "Explaining Attitudes from Behavior: A Cognitive Dissonance Approach," Working Paper Series rwp15-026, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    6. Boissonnet, Niels & Ghersengorin, Alexis & Gleyze, Simon, 2023. "Revealed deliberate preference change," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 142(C), pages 357-367.
    7. Niels Boissonnet & Alexis Ghersengorin & Simon Gleyze, 2022. "Revealed Deliberate Preference Change," Working Papers hal-03672734, HAL.
    8. Mukand, Sharun W. & Rodrik, Dani, 2018. "The Political Economy of Ideas," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 370, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    9. Elliott Ash & Sharun Mukand & Dani Rodrik, 2021. "Economic Interests, Worldviews, and Identities: Theory and Evidence on Ideational Politics," NBER Working Papers 29474, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    10. Mingli Zheng, 2014. "Lobbying for wealth redistribution by changing the social planner’s preferences," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 26(1), pages 79-92, January.

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