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Relevance of Voting Power

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  • Jan-Erik Lane
  • Sven Berg

Abstract

Democratic decision-making in groups requires institutions that aggregate the preference of the choice participants into a collective choice under the restriction that no player is a dictator. Constitutions deliver alternative rules for democratic decision-making, the consequences of which are best analysed using cooperative game theory. The emergence of a power index literature in the 1980s reflects the relevance of this type of modelling of institutions for groups like the European Union, stating modalities of power for the players.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan-Erik Lane & Sven Berg, 1999. "Relevance of Voting Power," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 11(3), pages 309-320, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jothpo:v:11:y:1999:i:3:p:309-320
    DOI: 10.1177/0951692899011003002
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Owen, G & Shapley, L S, 1989. "Optimal Location of Candidates in Ideological Space," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 18(3), pages 339-356.
    2. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489, May.
    3. Edelman, Paul H., 1997. "A note on voting," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 37-50, August.
    4. Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union," East European Series 48, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    5. Straffin, Philip Jr., 1994. "Power and stability in politics," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 32, pages 1127-1151, Elsevier.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Napel, Stefan & Widgrén, Mika, 2017. "Power measurement as sensitivity analysis: a unified approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 345, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    2. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Voting Power In The Governance Of The International Monetary Fund," Economic Research Papers 269354, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    3. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 2015. "The measurement of a priori voting power," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 8, pages 117-139, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung Im Ministerrat Nach Dem Vertrag Von Nizza Und Den Konventsvorschlagen In Einer Erweiterten Europaischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 14887, Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    5. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2006. "Proposal Rights and Political Power," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(2), pages 441-448, April.
    6. Stefan Napel & Mika Widgrén, 2002. "Strategic Power Revisited," CESifo Working Paper Series 736, CESifo.
    7. Leech, Dennis, 2001. "This paper illustrates that an international permit trading system may hurt relatively poor countries by making associated economic activities una¤ordable. A model is constructed in which the free mar," Economic Research Papers 269358, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    8. Leech, D., 2000. "Members' Voting Power in the Governance of the International Monetary Fund," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 583, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    9. Leech, D., 2000. "Computing Classical Power Indices For Large Finite Voting Games," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 579, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    10. Leech, Dennis, 2002. "Computing Power Indices For Large Voting Games," Economic Research Papers 269350, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    11. Leech, D., 2001. "Fair Reweighting of the Votes in the EU Council of Ministers and the Choice of Majority Requirement for Qualified Majority Voting during Successive Enlargements," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 587, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    12. Yener Kandogan, 2003. "DEMOCRACY???S SPREAD: Elections and Sovereign Debt in Developing Countries," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 2003-576, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
    13. Borkowski, Agnieszka, 2003. "Machtverteilung im Ministerrat: nach dem Vertrag von Nizza und den Konventsvorschlägen in einer erweiterten Europäischen Union," IAMO Discussion Papers 54, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Transition Economies (IAMO).
    14. Jonathan R. Strand & Kenneth J. Retzl, 2016. "Did Recent Voice Reforms Improve Good Governance within the World Bank?," Development and Change, International Institute of Social Studies, vol. 47(3), pages 415-445, May.

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