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The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union


  • Turnovec, Frantisek

    (Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education of Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic)


In this paper game-theoretical concepts of power indices are applied to evaluation of power (or influence) distribution among different European Union member states in a decision making processes in the Council of Ministers, Commission and European Parliament. Dynamics of distribution of power during a sequence of extensions is analyzed and possible consequences of future East European and Mediterranean extensions anticipated. A new voting rule concept is suggested and evaluated: the so called double majority principle, based on two sets of weights in voting: one given by the number of votes in a decision making body and the second by the proportion of GDP or proportion of population. Models of Commission, Council, and European Union interactions are investigated from the point of view of power distribution among the member states and among the three most important European institutions.

Suggested Citation

  • Turnovec, Frantisek, 1997. "The Double Majority Principle and Decision Making Games in Extending European Union," East European Series 48, Institute for Advanced Studies.
  • Handle: RePEc:ihs:ihsrop:48

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Bencik, Michal, 1996. "Revision of an Econometric Model for Slovakia," East European Series 38, Institute for Advanced Studies.
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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Bernard Steunenberg, 2001. "Enlargement and Institutional Reform in the European Union: Separate or Connected Issues?," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 351-370, December.
    2. Sutter, Matthias, 2000. "Flexible Integration, EMU and Relative Voting Power in the EU," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 104(1-2), pages 41-62, July.
    3. Szczypinska, Agnieszka, 2017. "Who gains more power in the EU after Brexit?," MF Working Papers 27, Ministry of Finance in Poland.
    4. repec:fau:fauart:v:68:y:2018:i:1:p:18-33 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item


    Coalition; Commission; Council of Ministers; Distribution of Power; Double Majority; European Parliament; Power Indices; Voting Procedures; Voting Weights;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D79 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Other
    • F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration


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