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Performance Under Pressure in the NBA

Author

Listed:
  • Zheng Cao

    (Department of Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA)

  • Joseph Price

    (Department of Economics, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT, USA)

  • Daniel F. Stone

    (Department of Economics, Oregon State University, Corvallis, OR, USA, dan.stone@oregonstate.edu)

Abstract

The authors analyze the effects of psychological pressure on performance using National Basketball Association (NBA) free throw data from the 2002-2003 through 2009-2010 seasons. The authors find evidence that players choke under pressure— they shoot on average 5-10 percentage points worse than normal in the final seconds of very close games. Choking is more likely for players who are worse overall free throw shooters, and on the second shot of a pair after the first shot is missed. In general, performance declines as pressure increases (as game time remaining decreases, and as the score margin decreases, whether the shooter’s team is winning or losing). However, the authors find no evidence of choking when games are tied in the final 15 seconds. The authors also fail to find evidence of performance under pressure being affected by home status, attendance, and whether or not the game is in the playoffs.

Suggested Citation

  • Zheng Cao & Joseph Price & Daniel F. Stone, 2011. "Performance Under Pressure in the NBA," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 12(3), pages 231-252, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:231-252
    DOI: 10.1177/1527002511404785
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Keywords

    choking; anxiety; pressure; clutch; NBA;
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