More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance
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Other versions of this item:
- Szech, Nora & Huck, Steffen & Wenner, Lukas, 2016. "More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design, and Performance," Annual Conference 2016 (Augsburg): Demographic Change 145644, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Steffen Huck & Nora Szech & Lukas M. Wenner, 2015. "More Effort with Less Pay: On Information Avoidance, Belief Design and Performance," CESifo Working Paper Series 5542, CESifo Group Munich.
- Huck, Steffen & Szech, Nora & Wenner, Lukas M., 2015. "More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2015-304, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Huck, Steffen & Szech, Nora & Wenner, Lukas M., 2015. "More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, belief design and performance," Working Paper Series in Economics 72, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Business Engineering.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2008. "Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment," Economics Working Papers 1116, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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- Dechenaux, Emmanuel & Kovenock, Dan & Sheremeta, Roman M., 2012. "A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments," Discussion Papers, Research Professorship & Project "The Future of Fiscal Federalism" SP II 2012-109, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- Armin Falk & Florian Zimmermann, 2016.
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More about this item
KeywordsOptimal Expectations; Belief Design; Performance; Real Effort Task; Coarse Incentive Structures; Workplace Incentives;
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- J31 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Wage Level and Structure; Wage Differentials
- M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2015-10-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2015-10-25 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-HRM-2015-10-25 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LMA-2015-10-25 (Labor Markets - Supply, Demand, & Wages)
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