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Is Lunch and other Break Time Productive in Sweden? A Hedonic Earnings Approach

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  • Paul S. Carlin

Abstract

This hedonic earnings analysis suggests that in Sweden in the mid-1980s, break time was, overall, productive at the margin—a result that contrasts with findings from similar studies using U.S. data. Among workers in “male†jobs, however, break time for meals appears to have been significantly less productive at the margin than normal work. To try to account for the male job effect, the author explores the possibility that high-productivity workers took longer breaks than other workers in response to high marginal tax rates, union-induced wage compression, or both. The results of his further analysis suggest that union-induced wage compression may have contributed to the male job effect, but he finds no support for the tax rate explanation.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul S. Carlin, 1997. "Is Lunch and other Break Time Productive in Sweden? A Hedonic Earnings Approach," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 50(2), pages 324-341, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:ilrrev:v:50:y:1997:i:2:p:324-341
    DOI: 10.1177/001979399705000208
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    References listed on IDEAS

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