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Foundations of Team and Cooperation Management

  • Alexandru W. A. POPP

    ()

    (McGill University, Canada)

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    The present study is concerned with a realistic framework and model that managers can employ in order to increase the synergy of their teams (i.e. increase the cooperation between the members of a group) and to offer different devices for a proper team leadership. There are many elements that contribute to the profitability of a business and of a network, where the latter is dependent on the actions of actors involved in that specific network. This research focuses on the analysis of interactions between members forming different teams and between the teams themselves, as well as on the leader’s management of the teams, members of teams and environment. A detailed description and analysis of laws, thus, their meaning and modus operandi, is provided. Laws are obligations backed by incentives. In order to properly understand today’s business environment, a quick overview of supply chains is offered: there is no firm that is not using or not part of a supply chain. The responsibilities that a manager has towards his teams and members of the teams are also portrayed.The foundations of a mathematical (game theoretic) framework for the coalitions (teams) is presented in order to better understand the setting and also to build a model that can be used in different environments. An externality to which particular attention is given to is the deviation of teams’ members. Moreover, certain recommendations, along with the reasons and outcomes regarding the management and administration of everyone involved in teams, are also conferred.

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    File URL: http://www.management.ase.ro/reveconomia/2012-1/1.pdf
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    Article provided by Faculty of Management, Academy of Economic Studies, Bucharest, Romania in its journal ECONOMIA seria MANAGEMENT / ECONOMY - MANAGEMENT series.

    Volume (Year): 15 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 (June)
    Pages: 5-18

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    Handle: RePEc:rom:econmn:v:15:y:2012:i:1:p:5-18
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