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Federal Antitrust Authority against Google: Economic Analysis for Special Markets
[ФАС против Google: экономический анализ для особых рынков]

Author

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  • Yusupova, Gyuzel F. (Юсупова, Гюзель)

    (National Research University Higher School of Economics)

Abstract

The forming features of markets with network effects including the software markets are essentially important for effective business models in various spheres of business activity. First of all, it is connected with understanding of network effect and reasons of its use which are key factors not only commercial success of products and services, but also forming of adequate measures of economic policy, including antitrust.The article describes the case against Google, Inc. and Google Ireland Limited company (affiliated company) on suspicion of violation of the Russian antitrust law. The market of the pre-installed applications for OC Android localized for Russia which represents the market with network effects is a subject of the economic analysis. The signs of antitrust violation include the characteristics of the multilateral markets, in particular a platform (app store of Google) on the sides of market without which very difficult to create and support directly the product at the market. Namely buidling or tying which can be considered as equivalent of excluding agreement to create barriers on the market for the potential newcomer. The description of similar cases like the case against Google, Inc. corporation and the Google Ireland Limited company, and also the case against the Microsoft company which showed all difficulties of law application in the field of monopolization constraint (in terms of USA antitrust law) or abuse of dominance (in terms of European antitrust legislation) have the opportunity to show the fact that such decisions can be justified in principle

Suggested Citation

  • Yusupova, Gyuzel F. (Юсупова, Гюзель), 2016. "Federal Antitrust Authority against Google: Economic Analysis for Special Markets [ФАС против Google: экономический анализ для особых рынков]," Ekonomicheskaya Politika / Economic Policy, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration, vol. 6, pages 82-99, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:ecopol:ep1664
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Whinston, Michael D, 1990. "Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(4), pages 837-859, September.
    2. Jean-Charles Rochet & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Platform Competition in Two-Sided Markets," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 990-1029, June.
    3. Michael D. Whinston, 2001. "Exclusivity and Tying in U.S. v. Microsoft: What We Know, and Don't Know," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 63-80, Spring.
    4. Jean Tirole, 2005. "The Analysis of Tying Cases: A Primer," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 1.
    5. Nicholas Economides, 2001. "The Microsoft Antitrust Case: Rejoinder," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 71-79, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    the Russian antitrust law; abuse of dominance; tying; market with multilateral network effects; platform; Google;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L42 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts

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