Riscophobie et étalement à moyenne constante : analyse et applications
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- Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1982. "Riscophobie et Etalement a Moyenne Constante: Analyse et Applications," Cahiers de recherche 8229, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
References listed on IDEAS
- Boyer, M. & Dionne, G., 1982. "The Choice Between Equivalent Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss," Cahiers de recherche 8230, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, G. & Eeckhoudt, L., 1982. "Risk Aversion, Insurance and Gambling," Cahiers de recherche 8243, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-648, July-Aug..
- Marcel Boyer & Georges Dionne, 1983. "Variations in the Probability and Magnitude of Loss: Their Impact on Risk," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 16(3), pages 411-419, August.
- Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- BOYER, Marcel & PORRINI, Donatella, 2010.
"Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors : An Exploratory Analysis,"
Cahiers de recherche
05-2010, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2010. "Optimal Liability Sharing and Court Errors: An Exploratory Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 3073, CESifo Group Munich.
- Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2010. "Optimal liability sharing and court errors: an exploratory analysis," Working Papers hal-00463913, HAL.
- Allain, Marie-Laure & Boyer, Marcel & Kotchoni, Rachidi & Ponssard, Jean-Pierre, 2015.
"Are cartel fines optimal? Theory and evidence from the European Union,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 38-47.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2013. "Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence from the European Union," CIRANO Working Papers 2013s-24, CIRANO.
- Marie-Laure Allain & Marcel Boyer & Rachidi Kotchoni & Jean-Pierre Ponssard, 2014. "Are Cartel Fines Optimal? Theory and Evidence From the European Union," Post-Print hal-01386062, HAL.
- Boyer, Marcel & Porrini, Donatella, 2011.
"The impact of court errors on liability sharing and safety regulation for environmental/industrial accidents,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 21-29, March.
- Marcel Boyer & Donatella Porrini, 2010. "The Impact of Court Errors on Liability Sharing and Safety Regulation for Environmental/Industrial Accidents," CIRANO Working Papers 2010s-48, CIRANO.
- Marcel Boyer & Philippe Mahenc & Michel Moreaux, 2007. "Environmental Protection, Consumer Awareness, Product Characteristics, and Market Power," CIRANO Working Papers 2007s-05, CIRANO.
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