Reputation in a Model with a Limited Debt Structure
This paper studies the optimal management of the maturity of government debt in an economy without commitment. We consider a reputation where any deviation triggers reversion to the worst sustainable equilibrium. We obtain two results. First, contrary to earlier literature, we show that a very rich debt structure is not a necessary condition to solve the time-inconsistency problem. Second, we learn how to allocate the outstanding debt into short and long-term bonds to enhance the credibility of the government policy. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Volume (Year): 8 (2005)
Issue (Month): 3 (July)
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