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Structures de marché et pratiques facilitant la collusion une approche par la théorie des jeux répétés


  • Thierry Pénard


[fre] Ces dernières années, les secteurs liés à l'agro-alimentaire ont été particulièrement actifs en matière de cartel et de collusion (Vitamine, acide citrique, lysine...). L'objectif de cet article est de comprendre comment ces cartels ont pu se mettre en place et se maintenir pendant de nombreuses années. Pour cela, nous mobilisons la théorie des jeux répétés qui fournit le meilleur cadre d'analyse des phénomènes de collusion. En particulier, les jeux répétés permettent d'identifier les structures de marché propices à la collusion. Cette théorie permet aussi de mieux apprécier le rôle que peuvent jouer au sein d'un cartel certaines pratiques comme des échanges d'information, des guerres de prix ou des surinvestissements en capacités. A partir des principaux enseignements des jeux répétés, nous procédons à une relecture d'une des décisions des autorités européennes relative au cartel de la lysine. [eng] Collusive market structures and facilitating practices through the repeated games lens - Agricultural and food industries have been largely involved in cartel activities (Vitamins, citric acid, lysine, sugar. . .) for the last decade. This article aims at understanding how these cartels have succeeded in implementing and enforcing collusive agreements. First I show that repeated games are the best theoretical framework to analyze collusion. This theory allows to identify the market structures that facilitate collusion. It also allows to evaluate much better the role of some practices inside a cartel, like exchanges of information, price wars or excess of capacity. Then repeated games are applied to the lysine case to provide some insights on the observed behaviors of lysine cartel members.

Suggested Citation

  • Thierry Pénard, 2003. "Structures de marché et pratiques facilitant la collusion une approche par la théorie des jeux répétés," Économie rurale, Programme National Persée, vol. 277(1), pages 80-98.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:recoru:ecoru_0013-0559_2003_num_277_1_5438 Note: DOI:10.3406/ecoru.2003.5438

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Berg, Sigbjorn Atle, 1986. "Excess capacity and the degree of collusion : The Norwegian experience, 1967-82," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 99-107, March.
    2. Abreu, Dilip, 1988. "On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 383-396, March.
    3. B. Douglas Bernheim & Michael D. Whinston, 1990. "Multimarket Contact and Collusive Behavior," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(1), pages 1-26, Spring.
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