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Social structure and cultures of corruption

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  • Kingston, Christopher

Abstract

Corruption often creates a "briber's dilemma": each of the "clients" competing for a rent allocated by a government official has an incentive to pay bribes to try to obtain preferential treatment, but they would all be better off if they could mutually commit not to pay bribes. This paper uses a model of linked games to show how informal relationships among the clients may enable them to enforce agreements (or norms) against paying bribes and how historical events can lead to the development of a "culture" of corruption that can subsequently prove hard to dislodge.

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  • Kingston, Christopher, 2008. "Social structure and cultures of corruption," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 90-102, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:67:y:2008:i:1:p:90-102
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    Cited by:

    1. Ratbek Dzhumashev, 2014. "The Two-Way Relationship Between Government Spending And Corruption And Its Effects On Economic Growth," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 32(2), pages 403-419, April.
    2. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Monash Economics Working Papers 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    3. Putrevu, Sanjay & McGuire, Jean & Siegel, Donald S. & Smith, David M., 2012. "Corporate social responsibility, irresponsibility, and corruption: Introduction to the special section," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 65(11), pages 1618-1621.
    4. Wu, Yanling & Tian, Gary Gang, 2021. "Public relations expenditure, media tone, and regulatory decisions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C).
    5. Raffaella Barone & Donato Masciandaro & Friedrich Schneider, 2022. "Corruption and money laundering: You scratch my back, i’ll scratch yours," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(1), pages 318-342, February.
    6. Ratbek Dzumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2010. "Non-collusive Corruption: Theory and Evidence from Education Sector in Bangladesh," Monash Economics Working Papers 38-10, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Dzhumashev Ratbek, 2016. "The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1169-1201, April.
    8. Jandhyala, Srividya & Oliveira, Fernando S., 2021. "The role of international anti-corruption regulations in promoting socially responsible practices," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 190(C), pages 15-32.
    9. Anne C Pisor & Michael Gurven, 2015. "Corruption and the Other(s): Scope of Superordinate Identity Matters for Corruption Permissibility," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(12), pages 1-24, December.

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