IDEAS home Printed from
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Politique monétaire, capital bancaire et liquidité des marchés

Listed author(s):
  • Olivier de Bandt
  • Christian Pfister

[eng] Monetary policy, bank capital and market liquidity The implementation of the Basel II Capital Accord highlights the role of bank capital in the conduct of monetary policy. The paper studies the three types of instances that central banks may face. In normal times, the distribution of bank capital across institutions influences the transmission mechanism of monetary policy (the « bank capital channel »), as confirmed by evidence available for a certain number of countries. During financial crisis periods, when systemic risk prevails, the existence of capital requirements does not preclude the ex post intervention of central banks as Lender of Last Resort, particularly in order to prevent liquidity crisis in interbank markets or to limit their effects. Finally, in the case of lasting difficulties in the banking sector hampering the functioning of monetary policy, the issues of the recapitalization of insolvent institutions by the government and of the provision of excess liquidity by the Central Bank need to be raised. JEL classifications : E5, G21, G28 [fre] La mise en place de Bâle II conduit à s'interroger sur le rôle du capital bancaire dans la conduite de la politique monétaire. L'article décrit les trois types de situations auxquelles les banques centrales peuvent se trouver confrontées. En période normale, la répartition des fonds propres bancaires entre établissements influence les mécanismes de transmission de la politique monétaire (« canal du capital bancaire »). En période de crise financière ou de risque systémique, l'existence de normes de capital n'exclut pas l'intervention ex post des banques centrales comme Prêteur en Dernier Ressort, notamment pour éviter des crises de liquidité sur les marchés interbancaires ou limiter leurs effets. Enfin, en cas de difficultés durables du système bancaire conduisant à l'inefficacité de la politique monétaire, les questions de la recapitalisation par l'État de certains établissements insolvables et de la fourniture d'une liquidité excédentaire par la Banque centrale se trouvent posées. Classification JEL : E5, G21, G28

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Revue d'économie financière.

Volume (Year): 73 (2003)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 213-226

in new window

Handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_73_4_5016
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecofi.2003.5016
Contact details of provider: Web page:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

in new window

  1. Jean-Charles Rochet & Xavier Vives, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort: Was Bagehot Right After All?," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(6), pages 1116-1147, December.
  2. Ehrmann, Michael & Gambacorta, Leonardo & Martinéz Pagés, Jorge & Sevestre, Patrick & Worms, Andreas, 2001. "Financial systems and the role of banks in monetary policy transmission in the euro area," Working Paper Series 0105, European Central Bank.
  3. Martin Feldstein, 2002. "The Role for Discretionary Fiscal Policy in a Low Interest Rate Environment," NBER Working Papers 9203, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2000. "A Theory of Bank Capital," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(6), pages 2431-2465, December.
  5. Christian Pfister, 2000. "Relations entre politique monétaire unique et politiques prudentielles," Revue Économique, Programme National Persée, vol. 51(3), pages 683-692.
  6. By James Morsink & Tamim Bayoumi, 2001. "A Peek Inside the Black Box: The Monetary Transmission Mechanism in Japan," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 48(1), pages 1-2.
  7. Robert L. Hetzel & Ralph F. Leach, 2001. "The Treasury-Fed Accord : a new narrative account," Economic Quarterly, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, issue Win, pages 33-55.
  8. Leonardo Gambacorta & Paolo Emilio Mistrulli, 2003. "Bank Capital and Lending Behaviour: Empirical Evidence for Italy," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 486, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  9. Douglas W. Diamond & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2005. "Liquidity Shortages and Banking Crises," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 60(2), pages 615-647, 04.
  10. Jeremy C. Stein & Anil K. Kashyap, 2000. "What Do a Million Observations on Banks Say about the Transmission of Monetary Policy?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(3), pages 407-428, June.
  11. C. H. Furfine, 2001. "The interbank market during a crisis," BIS Working Papers 99, Bank for International Settlements.
  12. Skander J. van den Heuvel, 2002. "Does bank capital matter for monetary transmission?," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue May, pages 259-265.
  13. Saito, Makoto & Shiratsuka, Shigenori, 2001. "Financial Crises As the Failure of Arbitrage: Implications for Monetary Policy," Monetary and Economic Studies, Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, vol. 19(S1), pages 239-270, February.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:recofi:ecofi_0987-3368_2003_num_73_4_5016. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.