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L'inefficacité d'une chaîne de monopoles : une étude expérimentale en situation de négociation répétée

  • Alexis Garapin
  • Michel Hollard
  • Stéphane Robin
  • Bernard Ruffieux

[fre] L'inefficacité d'une chaîne de monopoles : une étude expérimentale en situation de négociation répétée par Alexis Garapin, Michel Hollard, Stéphane Robin et Bernard Ruffieux La théorie (monopole bilatéral, double marginalisation) affirme que l'efficacité d'une chaîne de monopoles est inférieure à celle d'un monopole intégré. Ce résultat est valable tant du point de vue des monopoleurs bilatéraux que du point de vue du surplus collectif. Cet article teste la validité de ces résultats théoriques en situation expérimentale. Les résultats de l'expérience ne valident que partiellement les résultats théoriques. La fusion du monopole bilatéral dans un monopole simple conduit bien à un accroissement de l'efficacité en termes de surplus collectif, mais n'entraîne pas toujours une augmentation du profit joint des deux monopoleurs. [eng] The inefficiency of a chain of monopolies: an experimental study in a repeated-negotiation situation by Alexis Garapin, Michel Hollard, Stéphane Robin and Bernard Ruffieux Theory (bilateral monopoly, dual marginalisation) shows that a chain of monopolies is less efficient than an integrated monopoly. This result is valid both the joint profits of the bilateral monopolies and in terms of collective surplus. The goal of the present paper is to test the relevance of these theoretical conclusions in an experimental framework. The experimental results only partially confirm the theoretical conclusions. While the merger increases the welfare efficiency of the structure, it does not always increase the joint profit of the monopolies.

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Article provided by Programme National Persée in its journal Économie & prévision.

Volume (Year): 145 (2000)
Issue (Month): 4 ()
Pages: 1-18

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Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_2000_num_145_4_6109
Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.2000.6109
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  1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
  2. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284 Elsevier.
  3. Plott, Charles R. & Gray, Peter, 1990. "The multiple unit double auction," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 245-258, March.
  4. Coursey, Don, 1982. "Bilateral bargaining, pareto optimality, and the empirical frequency of impasse," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(2-3), pages 243-259.
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