IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/prs/ecoprv/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5167.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Licenciements, salaire aux pièces et participation aux bénéfices en tant qu'incitations

Author

Listed:
  • Kornelius Kraft

Abstract

[eng] Lay-offs, Piece-Rates and Profit-Sharing as Incentives, . by Kornelius Kraft.. . Lay-offs, or even just the likelihood of being laid off, profit-sharing and piece-rates are incentives which can be used alternatively. In particular, laid off wage earners have expenses even if they do end up finding work with the same remuneration. The purpose of the paper is to empirically test to what extent these incentives do increase effectiveness, based on information from German firms. Piecework pay is apparently not effective, profit-sharing is and lay-offs increase productivity but only underneath a certain threshold, regardless of the remuneration level. [spa] Los beneficios como incitaciones, . por Kornelius Kraft.. . Los despidos, o incluso la simple amenaza de despidos, la repartición de los beneficios, la remuneración por unidad producida son incitaciones eventualmente sustituibles, a la disposición de la empresa. En particular los asalariados despedidos tienen desventajas, aún si terminan encontrando un empleo igualmente remunerado. El propósito del artículo es el de probar empíricamente, partiendo de informaciones relativas a empresas de la RFA, en qué medida estas incitaciones mejoran la eficacia. Parece ser que la remuneración por unidad producida no es eficaz, que la repartición del beneficio lo es, y que los despidos mejoran la productividad, pero solamente sin llegar a un cierto umbral, y de manera independiente del nivel de la remuneración. [ger] Entlassungen, Stücklohn und Gewinnbeteiligung als Anreize, . von Kornelius Kraft.. . Entlassungen, oder schon allein drohende Entlassungen, Gewinnbeteiligung, Stucklohn, sind eventuell substituierbare Anreize, die den Unternehmen zur Verfügung stehen. Insbesondere entlassene Lohnempfänger müssen Nachteile auf sich nehmen, selbst wenn sie letzten Endes wieder eine Beschäftigung mit gleicher Bezahlung finden. Der Artikel zielt darauf ab, auf der Grundlage von Daten über die Unternehmen in der BRD empirisch zu testen, in welchem Ausmass dièse Anreize die Leistungsfähigkeit erhöhen. Es stellt sich heraus, dass im Gegensatz zum Stücklohn die Gewinnbeteiligung wirksam ist und dass Entlassungen die Leistungsfähigkeit erhöhen, aber nur bis zu einer gewissen Grenze und unabhängig von der Höhe der Entlohnung. [fre] Licenciements, salaire aux pièces et participation aux bénéfices en tant qu'incitations, . par Kornelius Kraft.. . Les licenciements, ou même la simple menace de licenciements, le partage des profits, la rémunération à la pièce sont des incitations, éventuellement substituables, à la disposition de l'entreprise. En particulier les salariés licenciés subissent des coûts, même s'ils finissent par retrouver un emploi également rémunéré. Le but de l'article est de tester empiriquement, à partir d'informations portant sur des entreprises de la Rfa, dans quelle mesure ces incitations améliorent l'efficacité. Il apparaît que la rémunération à la pièce n'est pas efficace, que le partage du profit l'est, et que les licenciements améliorent la productivité, mais seulement en deçà d'un certain seuil, et de manière indépendante du niveau de la rémunération.

Suggested Citation

  • Kornelius Kraft, 1990. "Licenciements, salaire aux pièces et participation aux bénéfices en tant qu'incitations," Économie et Prévision, Programme National Persée, vol. 92(1), pages 161-170.
  • Handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5167
    Note: DOI:10.3406/ecop.1990.5167
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.3406/ecop.1990.5167
    Download Restriction: no

    File URL: https://www.persee.fr/doc/ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5167
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Lazear, Edward P & Rosen, Sherwin, 1981. "Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(5), pages 841-864, October.
    2. Eaton, Curtis & White, William D, 1983. "The Economy of High Wages: An Agency Problem," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 50(198), pages 175-181, May.
    3. Yellen, Janet L, 1984. "Efficiency Wage Models of Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 200-205, May.
    4. Hausman, Jerry, 2015. "Specification tests in econometrics," Applied Econometrics, Publishing House "SINERGIA PRESS", vol. 38(2), pages 112-134.
    5. Green, Jerry R & Stokey, Nancy L, 1983. "A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(3), pages 349-364, June.
    6. Hall, Robert E, 1982. "The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(4), pages 716-724, September.
    7. Dilip Mookherjee, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 51(3), pages 433-446.
    8. Newey, Whitney K., 1987. "Specification tests for distributional assumptions in the Tobit model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1-2), pages 125-145.
    9. Williamson, Oliver E., 1980. "The organization of work a comparative institutional assessment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 5-38, March.
    10. Amemiya, Takeshi, 1984. "Tobit models: A survey," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1-2), pages 3-61.
    11. Rebitzer, James B, 1987. "Unemployment, Long-term Employment Relations, and Productivity Growth," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 69(4), pages 627-635, November.
    12. Hashimoto, Masanori & Raisian, John, 1985. "Employment Tenure and Earnings Profiles in Japan and the United States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 721-735, September.
    13. Krueger, Alan B & Summers, Lawrence H, 1988. "Efficiency Wages and the Inter-industry Wage Structure," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(2), pages 259-293, March.
    14. Frank, Robert H, 1984. "Are Workers Paid Their Marginal Products?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(4), pages 549-571, September.
    15. Weitzman, Martin L, 1985. "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 937-953, December.
    16. Weitzman, Martin L, 1983. "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Compensation Systems," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 93(372), pages 763-783, December.
    17. Blanchflower, David G & Oswald, Andrew J, 1987. "Profit Sharing--Can It Work?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(1), pages 1-19, March.
    18. Leibenstein, Harvey, 1979. "A Branch of Economics is Missing: Micro-Micro Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 17(2), pages 477-502, June.
    19. Pencavel, John H, 1972. "Wages, Specific Training, and Labor Turnover in US Manufacturing Industries," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 13(1), pages 53-64, February.
    20. Shapiro, Carl & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1984. "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(3), pages 433-444, June.
    21. Wales, T J & Woodland, A D, 1980. "Sample Selectivity and the Estimation of Labor Supply Functions," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(2), pages 437-468, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:prs:ecoprv:ecop_0249-4744_1990_num_92_1_5167. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Equipe PERSEE). General contact details of provider: https://www.persee.fr/collection/ecop .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.