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The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania

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  • Victor Dragotă
  • Radu Ciobanu

Abstract

Most of the studies regarding control premium are focussed on the case in which it is positive. We considered the case when it is negative, investigating the determinants of the discount for control, having as study case the Romanian listed companies. Comparative to the general case of control premium, discounts for control are also determined by some other specific factors, like the number of non-trading days and the cash ratio. Some determinant factors of control premium have an opposite influence when this is negative: the percentage of shares purchased in the transaction, the ownership concentration, the fact the buyer or the seller is domestic, and the existence of a major shareholder owning more than 50% of shares. Consequently, some factors usually used in explaining the control premium cannot be suitably used for the case of the discount for control. Moreover, the negative impact of the undiversified portfolio is validated.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor Dragotă & Radu Ciobanu, 2017. "The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2017(1), pages 36-54.
  • Handle: RePEc:prg:jnlpep:v:2017:y:2017:i:1:id:592:p:36-54
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    agency problems; Romania; control premium; discount offer; discount for control; mergers and acquisitions;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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