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Agency Problems and Synergistic Effects in Romania: The Determinants of the Control Premium

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  • Victor DRAGOTA

    () (Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchange, Department of Finance)

  • Carmen LIPARA

    () (Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchange, Department of Finance)

  • Radu CIOBANU

    () (Bucharest University of Economic Studies, Faculty of Finance, Insurance, Banking and Stock Exchange, Department of Finance)

Abstract

Estimation of the control premium remains one of the main concerns in the financial literature: different approaches take into consideration synergistic effects, agency problems, and the bargaining power of different agents. We estimated the level of the control premium and its determinants for Romanian listed companies in the period 2000–2011. The median of the control premium was 25%. Using a linear regression model, we found that the determinants of the control premium for Romanian listed companies are similar to those revealed for other countries. The control premium was directly related to the liquidity of the shares of the acquired company before the transaction, to the percentage share purchased in the transaction, and to the ownership concentration of the acquired company. Also, its level was higher if the buyer was a corporation, and also if the acquirer, or the majority shareholder before the transaction, was Romanian. The control premium was inversely related to the size of the acquired company, to the bargaining power of the buyer, and to the fact that the acquirer was already a shareholder of the target company. The control premium increases if the target company has a majority shareholder, or at least shareholders owning more than 33% of the equity capital, before the transaction, but decreases if the ownership is dispersed. Moreover, we find that the sector of the target company has an influence on the control premium. Thus, if the firm was active in services or in the machinery and equipment industry, the control premium was higher, while if it was active in agriculture, construction, the food industry, or the chemicals industry it was lower.

Suggested Citation

  • Victor DRAGOTA & Carmen LIPARA & Radu CIOBANU, 2013. "Agency Problems and Synergistic Effects in Romania: The Determinants of the Control Premium," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 63(2), pages 197-219, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:fau:fauart:v:63:y:2013:i:2:p:197-219
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Victor Dragotă & Radu Ciobanu, 2017. "The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2017(1), pages 36-54.
    2. Radu Ciobanu, 2014. "Does the Toehold Influence the Success of an M&A Transaction?," International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, Human Resource Management Academic Research Society, International Journal of Academic Research in Accounting, Finance and Management Sciences, vol. 4(1), pages 235-239, January.
    3. Semenescu Andreea & Curmei Cătălin Valeriu, 2015. "Using CSR to mitigate information asymmetry in the banking sector," Management & Marketing, Sciendo, vol. 10(4), pages 316-329, December.
    4. Gabriela Brendea, 2014. "Financing Behavior of Romanian Listed Firms in Adjusting to the Target Capital Structure," Czech Journal of Economics and Finance (Finance a uver), Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, vol. 64(4), pages 312-329, September.
    5. Victor Dragotă & Radu Ciobanu, . "The Unusual Case of the Discount Offers for Taking the Control: Evidence from Romania," Prague Economic Papers, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 0, pages 1-19.
    6. Sebastian Madalin Munteanu & Irina-Eugenia Iamandi & Eugeniu Tudor, 2015. "Evaluation Model of the Entrepreneurial Character in EU Countries," The AMFITEATRU ECONOMIC journal, Academy of Economic Studies - Bucharest, Romania, vol. 17(38), pages 1-76, February.
    7. repec:rjr:romjef:v::y:2018:i:4:p:120-133 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    control premium; mergers and acquisitions; agency problems; synergistic effects; bargaining power;

    JEL classification:

    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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