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Emergence of social inequality in the spatial harvesting of renewable public goods

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  • Jaideep Joshi
  • Åke Brännström
  • Ulf Dieckmann

Abstract

Spatially extended ecological public goods, such as forests, grasslands, and fish stocks, are at risk of being overexploited by selfish consumers–a phenomenon widely recognized as the ‘tragedy of the commons.’ The interplay of spatial and ecological dimensions introduces new features absent in non-spatial ecological contexts, such as consumer mobility, local information availability, and strategy evolution through social learning in neighborhoods. It is unclear how these features interact to influence the harvesting and dispersal strategies of consumers. To answer these questions, we develop and analyze an individual-based, spatially structured, eco-evolutionary model with explicit resource dynamics. We report the following findings. (1) When harvesting efficiency is low, consumers evolve a sedentary consumption strategy, through which the resource is harvested sustainably, but with harvesting rates far below their maximum sustainable value. (2) As harvesting efficiency increases, consumers adopt a mobile ‘consume-and-disperse’ strategy, which is sustainable, equitable, and gives maximum sustainable yield. (3) A further increase in harvesting efficiency leads to large-scale overexploitation. (4) If costs of dispersal are significant, increased harvesting efficiency also leads to social inequality between frugal sedentary consumers and overexploitative mobile consumers. Whereas overexploitation can occur without social inequality, social inequality always leads to overexploitation. Thus, we identify four conditions that–while being characteristic of technological progress in modern societies–risk social inequality and overexploitation: high harvesting efficiency, moderately low costs of dispersal, high consumer density, and the tendency of consumers to adopt new strategies rapidly. We also show how access to global information–another feature widespread in modern societies–helps mitigate these risks.Author summary: Throughout history, humans have shaped ecological landscapes, which in turn have influenced human behavior. This mutual dependence is epitomized when human consumers harvest a spatially extended renewable resource. Simple models predict that, when multiple consumers harvest a shared resource, each is tempted to harvest faster than his/her peers, putting the resource at risk of overexploitation. It is unclear, however, how the interplay among resource productivity, consumer mobility, and social learning in spatial ecological public goods games influences evolved consumer behavior. Here, using an individual-based, spatially structured, eco-evolutionary model of consumers and a resource, we find that increasing resource productivity initially promotes efficient resource use by enabling mobile consumption strategies, but eventually leads to inequality and overexploitation, as overexploitative mobile consumers coexist with frugal sedentary consumers. When consumers are impatient (i.e., eager to imitate successful strategies) or myopic (i.e., unaware of conditions outside of their neighborhoods), inequality and overexploitation tend to aggravate.

Suggested Citation

  • Jaideep Joshi & Åke Brännström & Ulf Dieckmann, 2020. "Emergence of social inequality in the spatial harvesting of renewable public goods," PLOS Computational Biology, Public Library of Science, vol. 16(1), pages 1-25, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:plo:pcbi00:1007483
    DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1007483
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    References listed on IDEAS

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