IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/pid/journl/v49y2010i4p719-740.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Monetary and Non-monetary Gift Exchange

Author

Listed:
  • Saima Mahmood

    (Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad
    Sate Bank of Pakistan)

  • Asad Zaman

    (International Islamic University, Islamabad)

Abstract

We study the role of reciprocity in a labour market field experiment. Recently, many experiments have been conducted to test the extent to which cash and non-monetary gifts affect workers’ productivity through social exchange. Our experiment concluded that non-monetary gifts are more effective at invoking reciprocal behaviour. Despite a higher preference for money, a non-monetary incentive results in a significant increase in productivity as compared to an equivalent cash gift. Extending the experiment for negative reciprocity, the results highlight the asymmetry of positive and negative reciprocity that exists in the field. Discontinuation of a monetary gift results in a stronger negative effect than the discontinuation of non-monetary gifts

Suggested Citation

  • Saima Mahmood & Asad Zaman, 2010. "Monetary and Non-monetary Gift Exchange," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 49(4), pages 719-740.
  • Handle: RePEc:pid:journl:v:49:y:2010:i:4:p:719-740
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/PDR/2010/Volume4/719-740.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May.
    2. Martin Brown & Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, 2004. "Relational Contracts and the Nature of Market Interactions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 72(3), pages 747-780, May.
    3. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2013. "Team Incentives: Evidence From A Firm Level Experiment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(5), pages 1079-1114, October.
    4. Ernst Fehr & Georg Kirchsteiger & Arno Riedl, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-459.
    5. Akerlof, George A, 1984. "Gift Exchange and Efficiency-Wage Theory: Four Views," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 79-83, May.
    6. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
    7. Hausman, Daniel M., 2000. "Revealed preference, belief, and game theory," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(01), pages 99-115, April.
    8. Carl M. Campbell III & Kunal S. Kamlani, 1997. "The Reasons for Wage Rigidity: Evidence from a Survey of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 112(3), pages 759-789.
    9. Sebastian Kube & Michel Andre Marechal & Clemens Puppe, 2012. "The Currency of Reciprocity: Gift Exchange in the Workplace," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1644-1662, June.
    10. Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 1999. "Wage Rigidity in a Competitive Incomplete Contract Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 106-134, February.
    11. Armin Falk, 2007. "Gift Exchange in the Field," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1501-1511, September.
    12. Puppe Clemens & Sebastian Kube & Michel Marechal, 2006. "Putting reciprocity to work - positive versus negative responses in the field," Natural Field Experiments 00291, The Field Experiments Website.
    13. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, Georg & Riedl, Arno, 1998. "Gift exchange and reciprocity in competitive experimental markets," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-34, January.
    14. Offerman, Theo, 2002. "Hurting hurts more than helping helps," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(8), pages 1423-1437, September.
    15. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
    16. Florian Englmaier & Stephen G. Leider, 2010. "Gift Exchange in the Lab - It is not (only) how much you give ..," CESifo Working Paper Series 2944, CESifo Group Munich.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Hammermann, Andrea & Mohnen, Alwine, 2014. "The pric(z)e of hard work," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 1-15.
    2. Saima Naeem & Asad Zaman, 2013. "For Love or Money? Motivating Workers," Working Papers id:5436, eSocialSciences.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gift Exchange; Non-monetary Perks; Social Exchange; Asymmetry of Reciprocity;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pid:journl:v:49:y:2010:i:4:p:719-740. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Khurram Iqbal). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/pideipk.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.