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The Provision of Finance to Small Businesses: Does the Banking Relationship Constrain Performance

Author

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  • Christine T. Ennew

    (University Nottingham)

  • Martin R. Binks

    (University Nottingham)

Abstract

The beneficial economic effects of entrepreneurial activity can only be realised if such activity is relatively unconstrained in both product and factor markets, finance has been widely identified as a potential constraint on entrepreneurial activity due to either debt or equity gaps. However, in terms of externally supplied finance, it is arguably the availability of debt which is of greatest signifi­cance to most entrepreneurs. Given the inevitable information problems associated with the provision of debt finance, the nature of the relationship between bank and entrepreneur can be of considerable importance in ensuring the appropriate financing decisions are made. This paper examines the link between the banking relationship and the extent to which entrepreneurs are constrained by financing arrangements. Empirical analysis of the extent to which the banking relationship constrains performance suggests that there is no significant difference between more and less successful entrepreneurs.

Suggested Citation

  • Christine T. Ennew & Martin R. Binks, 1995. "The Provision of Finance to Small Businesses: Does the Banking Relationship Constrain Performance," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 4(1), pages 57-73, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:pep:journl:v:4:y:1995:i:1:p:57-73
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June.
    2. Richard L. Constand & Jerome S. Osteryoung & Donald A. Nast, 1991. "Revolving Asset-Based Lending Contracts and the Resolution of Debt-Related Agency Problems," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 1(1), pages 15-28, Spring.
    3. David de Meza & David C. Webb, 1987. "Too Much Investment: A Problem of Asymmetric Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(2), pages 281-292.
    4. Stiglitz, Joseph E & Weiss, Andrew, 1981. "Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 393-410, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jean Bonnet & Sylvie Cieply & Marcus Dejardin, 2005. "Financial constraints on new firms: looking for regional disparities," Brussels Economic Review, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles, vol. 48(3), pages 217-246.
    2. Susan Coleman, 2004. "The "Liability of Newness" and Small Firm Access to Debt Capital: Is There a Link?," Journal of Entrepreneurial Finance, Pepperdine University, Graziadio School of Business and Management, vol. 9(2), pages 37-60, Summer.
    3. Meuleman, Miguel & De Maeseneire, Wouter, 2012. "Do R&D subsidies affect SMEs’ access to external financing?," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 580-591.
    4. Bergner, Sören Martin & Bräutigam, Rainer & Evers, Maria Theresia & Spengel, Christoph, 2017. "The use of SME tax incentives in the European Union," ZEW Discussion Papers 17-006, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
    5. Fredj Fhima & Walid Trabelsi, 2021. "Loan Officer and the Evolution of Bank-SMEs Relationship in Tunisia," International Journal of Economics and Finance, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 13(9), pages 1-41, August.
    6. Scott McCarthy & Barry Oliver & Martie-Louise Verreynne, 2017. "Bank financing and credit rationing of Australian SMEs," Australian Journal of Management, Australian School of Business, vol. 42(1), pages 58-85, February.
    7. Tensie Steijvers & Wim Voordeckers, 2009. "Collateral And Credit Rationing: A Review Of Recent Empirical Studies As A Guide For Future Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 23(5), pages 924-946, December.
    8. Fredj FHIMA & Ridha NOUIRA & Philippe ADAIR, 2023. "Financement des entreprises et prêts non perfor-mants en Tunisie," Region et Developpement, Region et Developpement, LEAD, Universite du Sud - Toulon Var, vol. 58, pages 65-81.
    9. Embun Suryani, 2018. "The Importance of Lender-borrower Relationships to the Availability of Small and Micro Credit: Case Study on Indonesian Kredit Usaha Rakyat Loans," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 8(4), pages 1-9.
    10. Pavel Lebedev, 2019. "Management Accounting Maturity Levels Continuum Model: a Conceptual Framework," European Journal of Economics and Business Studies Articles, Revistia Research and Publishing, vol. 5, January -.
    11. Mark Freel, 2007. "Are Small Innovators Credit Rationed?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 23-35, January.
    12. Voordeckers, Wim & Steijvers, Tensie, 2006. "Business collateral and personal commitments in SME lending," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 30(11), pages 3067-3086, November.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Banking ; Finance; Small Business; Small Firms; Relationship Banking; Bank;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • L25 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Performance
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • M13 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - New Firms; Startups

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