A Debt Overhang Model for Low-Income Countries
This paper presents a theoretical model to explain how debt overhang is generated in low-income countries and discusses its implications for aid design and debt relief. It finds that the extent of debt overhang and the effectiveness of debt relief depend on a recipient country’s initial economic conditions and level of total factor productivity. IMF Staff Papers (2008) 55, 654–678. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.13; published online 10 June 2008
Volume (Year): 55 (2008)
Issue (Month): 4 (December)
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