The Probationary Period as a Screening Device: The Monopolistic Insurer
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- Jaap Spreeuw, 2005. "The Probationary Period as a Screening Device: The Monopolistic Insurer," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory, Springer;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 5-14, June.
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- Jaap Spreeuw & Martin Karlsson, 2009. "Time Deductibles as Screening Devices: Competitive Markets," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(2), pages 261-278.
- Ma, Ben-jiang & Qiu, Chun-guang & Bi, Wen-jie, 2015. "An insurance contract with a low compensation period under adverse selection," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 67-74.
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