The Probationary Period as a Screening Device: The Monopolistic Insurer
Stiglitz , considering asymmetry of information in a monopolistic insurance market and the monetary deductible as a screening device, shows that an equilibrium is always of a separating type. High risks buy complete insurance whilst low risks buy partial insurance. In this paper, we show that a pooling equilibrium may exist if a probationary period, rather than the partial coverage in monetary terms, is used as a screening device. The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review (2005) 30, 5–14. doi:10.1007/s10836-005-1104-5
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Volume (Year): 30 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
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