IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/oup/rcorpf/v2y2014i2p154-187..html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Complexity and Loan Performance: Evidence from the Securitization of Commercial Mortgages

Author

Listed:
  • Craig H. Furfine

Abstract

Between 2001 and 2007, the complexity of commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) increased substantially. The median size of commercial mortgage loan pools tripled and the median number of AAA-rated tranches doubled. I examine whether deal complexity is related to loan performance by analyzing a sample of approximately 40,000 commercial mortgage loans from 334 CMBS deals. I find that loan performance is worse for loans in more complex securitizations. However, neither the price of a deal’s securities nor a deal’s risk retention reflected that complexity correlates with lower loan quality. These findings present a challenge for theories of optimal security design.

Suggested Citation

  • Craig H. Furfine, 2014. "Complexity and Loan Performance: Evidence from the Securitization of Commercial Mortgages," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 2(2), pages 154-187.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:2:y:2014:i:2:p:154-187.
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cft008
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Boot, Arnoud W A & Thakor, Anjan V, 1993. "Security Design," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 48(4), pages 1349-1378, September.
    2. Skreta, Vasiliki & Veldkamp, Laura, 2009. "Ratings shopping and asset complexity: A theory of ratings inflation," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 678-695, July.
    3. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
    4. Christine A. Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 63(3), pages 1291-1314, June.
    5. repec:oup:rfinst:v:25:y::i:11:p:3217-3258 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Agarwal, Sumit & Amromin, Gene & Ben-David, Itzhak & Chomsisengphet, Souphala & Evanoff, Douglas D., 2011. "The role of securitization in mortgage renegotiation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 102(3), pages 559-578.
    7. Peter M. DeMarzo, 2005. "The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A Model of Informed Intermediation," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 18(1), pages 1-35.
    8. Christine Parlour & Guillaume Plantin, 2008. "Loan Sales and Relationship Banking," Post-Print hal-03415832, HAL.
    9. Benmelech, Efraim & Dlugosz, Jennifer & Ivashina, Victoria, 2012. "Securitization without adverse selection: The case of CLOs," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 91-113.
    10. Sheridan Titman & Sergey Tsyplakov, 2010. "Originator Performance, CMBS Structures, and the Risk of Commercial Mortgages," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(9), pages 3558-3594.
    11. Bruce Ian Carlin & Shimon Kogan & Richard Lowery, 2013. "Trading Complex Assets," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(5), pages 1937-1960, October.
    12. Cem Demiroglu & Christopher James, 2012. "How Important is Having Skin in the Game? Originator-Sponsor Affiliation and Losses on Mortgage-backed Securities," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(11), pages 3217-3258.
    13. Caballero, R J. & Krishnamurthy, A., 2008. "Musical chairs: a comment on the credit crisis," Financial Stability Review, Banque de France, issue 11, pages 9-11, February.
    14. Peter DeMarzo & Darrell Duffie, 1999. "A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 65-100, January.
    15. Benjamin J. Keys & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2012. "Lender Screening and the Role of Securitization: Evidence from Prime and Subprime Mortgage Markets," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(7), pages 2071-2108.
    16. An, Xudong & Deng, Yongheng & Gabriel, Stuart A., 2011. "Asymmetric information, adverse selection, and the pricing of CMBS," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(2), pages 304-325, May.
    17. Adam Ashcraft & Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham & Peter Hull & James Vickery, 2011. "Credit Ratings and Security Prices in the Subprime MBS Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(3), pages 115-119, May.
    18. Gorton, Gary & Pennacchi, George, 1990. "Financial Intermediaries and Liquidity Creation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 49-71, March.
    19. Riddiough, Timothy J., 1997. "Optimal Design and Governance of Asset-Backed Securities," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 121-152, April.
    20. Benjamin J. Keys & Tanmoy Mukherjee & Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig, 2010. "Did Securitization Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(1), pages 307-362.
    21. Agarwal, Sumit & Chang, Yan & Yavas, Abdullah, 2012. "Adverse selection in mortgage securitization," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 640-660.
    22. David Hirshleifer & Sonya Seongyeon Lim & Siew Hong Teoh, 2009. "Driven to Distraction: Extraneous Events and Underreaction to Earnings News," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 2289-2325, October.
    23. Donald P. Morgan, 2002. "Rating Banks: Risk and Uncertainty in an Opaque Industry," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 874-888, September.
    24. Malamud, Semyon & Rui, Huaxia & Whinston, Andrew, 2013. "Optimal incentives and securitization of defaultable assets," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 107(1), pages 111-135.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Célérier, Claire & Vallée, Boris, 2016. "Catering to investors through product complexity," ESRB Working Paper Series 14, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Vink, Dennis & Nawas, Mike & van Breemen, Vivian, 2021. "Security design and credit rating risk in the CLO market," Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. Allen, Franklin & Barbalau, Adelina, 2024. "Security design: A review," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Jed J. Neilson & Stephen G. Ryan & K. Philip Wang & Biqin Xie, 2022. "Asset‐Level Transparency and the (E)valuation of Asset‐Backed Securities," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 60(3), pages 1131-1183, June.
    5. Kempf, Elisabeth, 2017. "The Job Rating Game: The Effects of Revolving Doors on Analyst Incentives," Working Papers 258, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    6. José María Liberti & Mitchell A. Petersen, 2018. "Information: Hard and Soft," NBER Working Papers 25075, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Adelino, Manuel & Scott Frame, W. & Gerardi, Kristopher, 2017. "The effect of large investors on asset quality: Evidence from subprime mortgage securities," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-51.
    8. Vivian M. van Breemen & Frank J. Fabozzi & Mike Nawas & Dennis Vink, 2024. "Creditor protection and credit ratings in the US RMBS market," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 33(3), pages 267-292, August.
    9. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    10. Marc Arnold & Dustin Schuette & Alexander Wagner, 2021. "Neglected Risk in Financial Innovation: Evidence from Structured Product Counterparty Exposure," European Financial Management, European Financial Management Association, vol. 27(2), pages 287-325, March.
    11. Solomon Y. Deku & Alper Kara & David Marques‐Ibanez, 2019. "Trustee reputation in securitization: When does it matter?," Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 28(2), pages 61-84, May.
    12. Liu, Wenzhen & Wu, Wenfeng, 2023. "Underwriter reputation and the pricing of securities: Evidence from asset-backed securities," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).
    13. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Marqués-Ibáñez, David, 2019. "Do reputable issuers provide better-quality securitizations?," Working Paper Series 2236, European Central Bank.
    14. Gürtler, Marc & Koch, Florian, 2021. "Multidimensional skin in the game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    15. Xudong An & Lawrence R. Cordell & Nicholas Smith, 2023. "CMBS Market Evolution and Emerging Risks," Working Papers 23-27, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    16. Martin Hibbeln & Werner Osterkamp, 2024. "Simple is simply not enough—features versus labels of complex financial securities," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 27(2), pages 113-150, July.
    17. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Marques-Ibanez, David, 2022. "Bank reputation and securitization quality: European evidence," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PB).
    18. Adelino, Manuel & Gerardi, Kristopher & Hartman-Glaser, Barney, 2019. "Are lemons sold first? Dynamic signaling in the mortgage market," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 1-25.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Hibbeln, Martin & Osterkamp, Werner, 2024. "The Impact of Risk Retention on Moral Hazard in the Securitization Market," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 163(C).
    2. Martin Hibbeln & Werner Osterkamp, 2025. "The impact of risk retention on the pricing of securitizations," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 28(1), pages 1-24, April.
    3. Brendan Daley & Brett Green & Victoria Vanasco, 2020. "Securitization, Ratings, and Credit Supply," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 75(2), pages 1037-1082, April.
    4. Deku, Solomon Y. & Kara, Alper & Zhou, Yifan, 2019. "Securitization, bank behaviour and financial stability: A systematic review of the recent empirical literature," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 245-254.
    5. Kuong, John Chi-Fong & Zeng, Jing, 2021. "Securitization and optimal foreclosure," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 48(C).
    6. Allen, Franklin & Barbalau, Adelina, 2024. "Security design: A review," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    7. Gürtler, Marc & Hibbeln, Martin, 2012. "How smart are investors after the subprime mortgage crisis? Evidence from the securitization market," Working Papers IF39V1, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Institute of Finance.
    8. Hartman-Glaser, Barney & Piskorski, Tomasz & Tchistyi, Alexei, 2012. "Optimal securitization with moral hazard," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(1), pages 186-202.
    9. Chen, Zhizhen & Liu, Frank Hong & Opong, Kwaku & Zhou, Mingming, 2017. "Short-term safety or long-term failure? Empirical evidence of the impact of securitization on bank risk," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 48-74.
    10. Spiros Bougheas, 2014. "Pooling, tranching, and credit expansion," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 66(2), pages 557-579.
    11. Rossen Valkanov & Andra Ghent, 2014. "Complexity in Structured Finance: Financial Wizardry or Smoke and Mirrors," 2014 Meeting Papers 104, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    12. Matthew J. Botsch, 2022. "Public and Private Benefits of Information in Markets for Securitized Assets," Eastern Economic Journal, Palgrave Macmillan;Eastern Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 319-365, June.
    13. Gong, Di & Wu, Jin & Zhu, Jigao, 2023. "When banks' shadow fades and shadow banking rises: Securitization and loan performance in China," BOFIT Discussion Papers 4/2023, Bank of Finland Institute for Emerging Economies (BOFIT).
    14. Walter D'Lima & Luis Arturo Lopez, 2021. "Trustee affiliation and servicer oversight: Evidence from CMBS markets," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 49(3), pages 699-732, September.
    15. Fenner, Arved & Klein, Philipp & Mössinger, Carina, 2021. "Better be careful: The replenishment of ABS backed by SME loans," Discussion Papers 30/2021, Deutsche Bundesbank.
    16. Andra Ghent & Rossen Valkanov, 2016. "Comparing Securitized and Balance Sheet Loans: Size Matters," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(10), pages 2784-2803, October.
    17. Adelino, Manuel & Scott Frame, W. & Gerardi, Kristopher, 2017. "The effect of large investors on asset quality: Evidence from subprime mortgage securities," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(C), pages 34-51.
    18. Manuel Adelino & Kristopher Gerardi & Barney Hartman-Glaser, 2016. "Are Lemons Sold First? Dynamic Signaling in the Mortgage Market," FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2016-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta.
    19. Abdul Halim, Zairihan & How, Janice & Verhoeven, Peter & Hassan, M. Kabir, 2020. "Asymmetric information and securitization design in Islamic capital markets," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
    20. Sascha Tobias Wengerek & Benjamin Hippert & André Uhde, 2019. "Risk allocation through securitization - Evidence from non-performing loans," Working Papers Dissertations 58, Paderborn University, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:2:y:2014:i:2:p:154-187.. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Oxford University Press (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://academic.oup.com/rcfs .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.