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Design of fiscal frameworks and compliance with fiscal rules in CESEE

Author

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  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter

    () (Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Economic Studies Division)

Abstract

This paper analyzes the fiscal frameworks (i.e. the fiscal rules, fiscal councils and medium- term budgetary frameworks) in place in the 11 Central, Eastern and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries among the 28 EU Member States (EU-28). In recent years especially, these countries have significantly expanded and strengthened their fiscal frameworks, relying mostly on debt and expenditure rules with quite strong medium-term budgetary frameworks (MTBFs). The 11 CESEE EU countries adhered to their own fiscal rules in approximately 65% of the years between 1995 and 2015, mainly due to their very high compliance with debt and expenditure rules. While average compliance is currently higher in the CESEE EU countries than in the EU-28, it is actually decreasing over time, while increasing in the EU-28 sample.

Suggested Citation

  • Wolf Heinrich Reuter, 2016. "Design of fiscal frameworks and compliance with fiscal rules in CESEE," Focus on European Economic Integration, Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian Central Bank), issue 3, pages 29-40.
  • Handle: RePEc:onb:oenbfi:y:2016:i:3:b:2
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    File URL: https://www.oenb.at/dam/jcr:57c3fcb6-102f-4a58-8bb9-be0203cc6f78/feei_2016_q3_studies02_reuter.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Charles Wyplosz, 2012. "Fiscal Rules: Theoretical Issues and Historical Experiences," NBER Chapters,in: Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, pages 495-525 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. repec:eee:poleco:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:69-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2018. "Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-92.
    4. Iara, Anna & Wolff, Guntram B., 2014. "Rules and risk in the Euro area," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 34(C), pages 222-236.
    5. Xavier Debrun & Laurent Moulin & Alessandro Turrini & Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2008. "Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 297-362, April.
    6. Nerlich, Carolin & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2013. "The design of national fiscal frameworks and their budgetary impact," Working Paper Series 1588, European Central Bank.
    7. Till Cordes & Tidiane Kinda & Priscilla S Muthoora & Anke Weber, 2015. "Expenditure Rules; Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy?," IMF Working Papers 15/29, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2015. "National numerical fiscal rules: Not complied with, but still effective?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 67-81.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal frameworks; compliance with fiscal rules; fiscal councils; medium-term budgetary framework;

    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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