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Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion

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  • Goodhart, Lucy

Abstract

Who decides policy in a coalition government? Specifically, does the party occupying a ministerial portfolio control policy in that jurisdiction? This question is central to the study of coalitions but is rarely tested because of the problems in identifying and measuring policy. This paper sidesteps these obstacles using an empirical strategy based on rational partisan theory. The theory establishes expectations of changes in monetary policy and macro-economic outcomes following changes in policy-maker. By testing for partisan effects following portfolio changes we can infer which changes are relevant and to what degree the Minister of Finance is the autonomous monetary policy-maker. The application of the test, looking at 16 parliamentary democracies in a period of volatile monetary policy and flexible exchange rates, indicates that policy-making is not consistent with full ministerial discretion. Rather, policy appears more responsive to changes in cabinet leadership and to the preferences of cabinet leaders.

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  • Goodhart, Lucy, 2013. "Who Decides? Coalition Governance and Ministerial Discretion," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 8(3), pages 205-237, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:jlqjps:100.00011081
    DOI: 10.1561/100.00011081
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David P Baron, 2018. "Elections and durable governments in parliamentary governments," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 30(1), pages 74-118, January.
    2. Hanna Bäck & Wolfgang C. Müller & Benjamin Nyblade, 2017. "Multiparty government and economic policy-making," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 33-62, January.
    3. Lanny W. Martin & Georg Vanberg, 2020. "Coalition Government, Legislative Institutions, and Public Policy in Parliamentary Democracies," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 64(2), pages 325-340, April.
    4. Shadmehr, Mehdi, 2015. "Simple decision rules in small groups: Collegial rule vs. rotational rule," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 51-63.

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