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Structural Estimation and Experiments: Applications to Contracting Models

Listed author(s):
  • Charles Bellemare
  • Steeve Marchand
  • Bruce Shearer

Structural estimation requires the specification of behavioral models that can be used to conduct ex ante policy evaluations and welfare analysis. Experiments generate data by exogenously varying key variables to measure outcomes under various treatment conditions. Gains from combining experiments and structural estimation can be considerable. We illustrate these gains through two recent papers (Bellemare and Shearer, 2011, 2013) in the area of contracts and compensation systems. In both papers, the combination of structural modeling and experiments is essential - experiments cannot be conducted to implement all possible treatments of interest, while structural estimation using naturally occurring (payroll) data either is infeasible or requires restrictive modeling assumptions.

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Article provided by Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen in its journal Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics.

Volume (Year): 172 (2016)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 342-363

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Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201606)172:2_342:seaeat_2.0.tx_2-n
DOI: 10.1628/10.1628/093245616X14540550139746
Contact details of provider: Web page: https://www.mohr.de/jite

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  1. Daniel A. Ackerberg & Maristella Botticini, 2002. "Endogenous Matching and the Empirical Determinants of Contract Form," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(3), pages 564-591, June.
  2. Esther Duflo & Rema Hanna & Stephen P. Ryan, 2012. "Incentives Work: Getting Teachers to Come to School," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(4), pages 1241-1278, June.
  3. Patrick Bajari & Ali Hortacsu, 2005. "Are Structural Estimates of Auction Models Reasonable? Evidence from Experimental Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 113(4), pages 703-741, August.
  4. Adam Copeland & Cyril Monnet, 2009. "The Welfare Effects of Incentive Schemes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 76(1), pages 93-113.
  5. Charles Bellemare & Sabine Kröger & Arthur van Soest, 2008. "Measuring Inequity Aversion in a Heterogeneous Population Using Experimental Decisions and Subjective Probabilities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(4), pages 815-839, July.
  6. Orazio P. Attanasio & Costas Meghir & Ana Santiago, 2012. "Education Choices in Mexico: Using a Structural Model and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 37-66.
  7. Joshua D. Angrist & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, 2009. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 8769.
  8. George A. Akerlof, 1982. "Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 97(4), pages 543-569.
  9. Oriana Bandiera & Iwan Barankay & Imran Rasul, 2007. "Incentives for Managers and Inequality among Workers: Evidence from a Firm-Level Experiment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 122(2), pages 729-773.
  10. Meta Brown & Christopher J. Flinn & Andrew Schotter, 2011. "Real-Time Search in the Laboratory and the Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 101(2), pages 948-974, April.
  11. Gary Burtless, 1995. "The Case for Randomized Field Trials in Economic and Policy Research," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 9(2), pages 63-84, Spring.
  12. Armin Falk, 2007. "Gift Exchange in the Field," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 75(5), pages 1501-1511, September.
  13. Ashenfelter, Orley, 1987. "The case for evaluating training programs with randomized trials," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 6(4), pages 333-338, August.
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