Bribes and Business Tax Evasion
This paper investigates the role of governance, in particular bribes to tax officials, in shaping business tax compliance behavior in transition economies. The empirical results show that business noncompliance rises with the frequency of tax related bribes. More specifically, the findings from 27 economies suggest that tax evasion thrives when bribes to tax officials are commonplace. These findings are robust to a number of specifications that control for firm and country attributes as well as address the potential endogeneity of bribes.
Volume (Year): 6 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (December)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Corso Matteotti 22 - Castellanza (VA) 21053|
Phone: +39 (0)331-572 1
Fax: +39 (0)331-572 320
Web page: http://eaces.liuc.it/default.asp
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Heckman, James J, 1979.
"Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error,"
Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 153-161, January.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2000.
"Who must pay bribes and how much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
2486, The World Bank.
- Jakob Svensson, 2003. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a Cross Section of Firms," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 118(1), pages 207-230.
- Svensson, Jakob, 2002. "Who Must Pay Bribes and How Much? Evidence from a cross-section of firms," Seminar Papers 713, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Simon Johnson & Daniel Kaufmann & John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, 2003.
"Why Do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity after Communism,"
- Johnson, Simon & Kaufmann, Daniel & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 2000. "Why do firms hide? Bribes and unofficial activity after communism," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 495-520, June.
- Johnson, Simon & McMillan, John & Woodruff, Christopher, 1999. "Why do Firms Hide? Bribes and Unofficial Activity After Communism," CEPR Discussion Papers 2105, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Marrelli, Massimo, 1984. "On indirect tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1-2), pages 181-196, November.
- Gideon Yaniv, 1996. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: Note," Public Finance Review, SAGE Publishing, vol. 24(4), pages 501-505, October.
- Alm, James & Torgler, Benno, 2006.
"Culture differences and tax morale in the United States and in Europe,"
Journal of Economic Psychology,
Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 224-246, April.
- James Alm & Benno Torgler, 2004. "Culture Differences and Tax Morale in the United States and in Europe," CREMA Working Paper Series 2004-14, Center for Research in Economics, Management and the Arts (CREMA).
- Virmani, Arvind, 1989. "Indirect tax evasion and production efficiency," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 223-237, July.
- Crocker, Keith J. & Slemrod, Joel, 2005.
"Corporate tax evasion with agency costs,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-1610, September.
- Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November.
- John E. Anderson, 2005. "Fiscal Reform and its Firm-Level Effects in Eastern Europe and Central Asia," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp800, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Kreutzer, David & Lee, Dwight R., 1988. "Tax Evasion and Monopoly Output Decisions: A Reply," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(4), pages 583-84, December.
- Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Sabirianova Peter, Klara, 2007.
"Public sector pay and corruption: Measuring bribery from micro data,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 91(5-6), pages 963-991, June.
- Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Sabirianova Peter, Klara, 2006. "Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 5585, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Peter, Klara Sabirianova, 2006. "Public Sector Pay and Corruption: Measuring Bribery from Micro Data," IZA Discussion Papers 1987, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Marrelli, M. & Martina, R., 1988. "Tax evasion and strategic behaviour of the firms," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 55-69, October.
- Wang, Leonard F.S. & Conant, John L., 1988. "Corporate Tax Evasion and Output Decisions of the Uncertain Monopolist," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 41(4), pages 579-81, December.
- Kong-Pin & C.Y. Cyrus Chu, 2005. "Internal Control versus External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax Evasion," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(1), pages 151-164, Spring.
- Volodymyr Bilotkach, 2006. "A Tax Evasion - Bribery Game: Experimental Evidence from Ukraine," European Journal of Comparative Economics, Cattaneo University (LIUC), vol. 3(1), pages 31-49, June.
- Cremer, Helmuth & Gahvari, Firouz, 1993. "Tax evasion and optimal commodity taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 261-275, February.
- Mihir A. Desai, 2005. "The Degradation of Reported Corporate Profits," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 19(4), pages 171-192, Fall.
- Clotfelter, Charles T, 1983. "Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 65(3), pages 363-73, August.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:liu:liucej:v:6:y:2009:i:2:p:227-244. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Piero Cavaleri)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.