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A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects

Author

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  • Piers Fleming
  • Daniel Zizzo

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Abstract

As a stress test of experimenter demand effects, we run an experiment where subjects can physically destroy coupons awarded to them. About one subject out of three does. Giving money back to the experimenter is possible in a separate task but is more consistent with an experimenter demand effect than an explanation based on altruism towards the experimenter. A measure of sensitivity to social pressure helps predict destruction when social information is provided. Copyright The Author(s) 2015

Suggested Citation

  • Piers Fleming & Daniel Zizzo, 2015. "A simple stress test of experimenter demand effects," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 219-231, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:78:y:2015:i:2:p:219-231
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-014-9419-2
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11238-014-9419-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Guala, Francesco & Mittone, Luigi, 2010. "Paradigmatic experiments: The Dictator Game," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 39(5), pages 578-584, October.
    2. Ivo Bischoff & Björn Frank, 2011. "Good news for experimenters: Subjects are hard to influence by instructorsʹ cues," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(4), pages 3221-3225.
    3. Frank, Bjorn, 1998. "Good news for experimenters: subjects do not care about your welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 61(2), pages 171-174, November.
    4. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
    5. Zizzo, Daniel John & Fleming, Piers, 2011. "Can experimental measures of sensitivity to social pressure predict public good contribution?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 111(3), pages 239-242, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sadrieh, Abdolkarim & Schröder, Marina, 2016. "Materialistic, pro-social, anti-social, or mixed – A within-subject examination of self- and other-regarding preferences," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 114-124.
    2. repec:spr:jesaex:v:4:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s40881-018-0051-8 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Yola Engler & Rudolf Kerschbamer & Lionel Page, 2016. "Guilt-Averse or Reciprocal? Looking at Behavioural Motivations in the Trust Game," QuBE Working Papers 039, QUT Business School.
    4. Karakostas, Alexandros & Zizzo, Daniel John, 2016. "Compliance and the power of authority," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 67-80.
    5. Bayer, Ralph C. & Renou, Ludovic, 2016. "Logical omniscience at the laboratory," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 64(C), pages 41-49.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Altruism; Experimenter demand effects; Social information; Social pressure; B41; C72; C91; D64;

    JEL classification:

    • B41 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Economic Methodology - - - Economic Methodology
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy; Intergenerational Transfers

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