Coalitional Interval Games for Strategic Games in Which Players Cooperate
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- Luisa Carpente & Balbina Casas-Méndez & Ignacio García-Jurado & Anne Nouweland, 2010. "The truncated core for games with upper bounds," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 39(4), pages 645-656, October.
- Li, Deng-Feng, 2011. "Linear programming approach to solve interval-valued matrix games," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 655-666, December.
More about this item
Keywordsstrategic games; coalitional interval games; superadditive games; axiomatic characterization; C71; C72;
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
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