On the Relative Strengths of Altruism and Fairness
Some researchers have attributed deviations from selfish behavior to fairness. Violations of fairness theories, however, are observed in experimental dictator games with transfer rates greater than 1 (a transfer of x from the dictator yields an income of tx for the beneficiary, where x > tx): the dictatorâ€™s final income is less than the beneficiaryâ€™s. We theoretically propose that dictator giving also involves altruism, further supporting our claim with empirical evidence from four separate samples of dictator game experiments. Our nonlinear specification allows the relative measurement of the independent motives in dictator behavior. Copyright Springer 2006
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Volume (Year): 60 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (02)
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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Zizzo, D.J. & Oswald, A., 2000.
"Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others' Incomes?,"
The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS)
568, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Daniel J. Zizzo & Andrew J. Oswald, 2001. "Are People Willing to Pay to Reduce Others'Incomes?," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 63-64, pages 39-65.
- Bolle, Friedel & Kritikos, Alexander S., 2004. "Altruistic Behavior Under Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 229, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
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